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American society increasingly relies on technology and a faster pace to 
accomplish more tasks more quickly. Consequently, the hallmarks of our 
culture have become speed, efficiency, and technology. This phenomenon 
produces practical benefits, including higher productivity and a higher 
standard of living. However, these benefits are realized at some cost. 
Consider, for example, the following scenarios: a person is killed because 
the smoke detector upon which he relied to replace human vigilance was 
disabled;' a person is killed on a sidewalk when a fast-food employee rushes 
on a bicycle to make a de l i~e ry ;~  a motorist is killed when another dnver is 
distracted while using a cellular te leph~ne.~ These examples illustrate the 
increased potential for harm that can result from careless conduct. This 
conduct is more likely to occur as society increasingly relies upon and 
emphasizes these hallmarks. 
The potential for increased societal harm generated by the combination 
of technological reliance and an up-tempo lifestyle poses a challenge to the 
law. As persons consciously choose to sacrifice a measure of care to 
1. See Janan Hanna, Dismantling of Smoke A l a m  Not Criminal, Jury Fin& A umm 
Man Not Guilty in Sister's Deuth, CHI. TRIB., June 19, 1997, at 1. William Doyle 
disconnected the smoke detectors in his apartment because they were often activated as a 
result of his cigarette smoking and his cooking. Id. When his three-year-old sister died in 
a fire in the apartment, Doyle was charged with involuntary manslaughter. A jury found 
Doyle not guilty on the charge. However, Doyle was found guilty of the misdemeanor of 
child endangerment. Id. 
2. See Tom Raftery, Bicyclist Hits, Kills Man, 68, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Nov. 19, 
1997, at 36 (reporting that a sixty-eight-year-old pedestrian was struck and killed by a take- 
out delivery person on a bicycle); see also Teny Pristin, Question After a Fatal Bicycle 
C m h :  At What Price Fast Food?, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 30, 1997, at 45. A businessman 
sustained serious injuries when he was knocked to the pavement by a food delivery person 
on a bicycle who "flew through the intersection." Id. The article noted that "[tlhe potential 
hazards posed by cyclists on the city's crowded streets and sidewalks were thrown into sharp 
focus . . .  by the death of a 68 year-old pedestrian who was struck on [a] sidewalk by a 
takeout-chicken delivery person." Id. "The Mayor ordered a police crackdown, and a 
member of the City Council called for stricter rules against reckless cyclists." Id. 
3. See Selwyn Crawford, $6.5 Million Is A warded in C m h ;  Teen Driver Using cell 
Phone Judged Responsible in Tot's Death, DALLAS M O R N ~ G  NEWS, May 2 1, 1997,'at 29A. 
A teenage driver lost control of her van while answering her cellular phone. Id. As a result, 
she caused a traffic accident that resulted in the death of a three-year-old child. The accident 
also left the boy's father with severe brain damage and the boy's mother with minor injuries. 
The couple's daughter suffered a broken neck in the head-on collision. Id. 
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accomplish more tasks more quickly, the law, and particularly the criminal 
law, must assess whether it is necessary to adjust rules of conduct to the 
phenomenon of relaxed standards of care. Although criminal law has never 
been comfortable with punishing individuals for mere carelessness, the 
increased potential for technology-related accidents in our fast-paced culture 
makes it necessary to reexamine this reluctance and to question whether 
there are circumstances when lack of due care should be a sufficient 
predicate for invoking the sanctions of criminal law. 
Societal protection has consistently been the paramount goal of modem 
criminal law.4 Criminal punishment typically achieves such protection 
through its capacity to motivate people to conform to socially acceptable 
rules of behavior with threats of serious penalties for non~onformity.~ This 
objective of deterring unacceptable behavior is most effective when 
individuals have the capacity to consciously choose the direction of their 
behavior, but it is less successful when free choice is absent or substantially 
4. See, e.g., OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 49 (1923); see also 
WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. SCOTT, JR., HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAW $ 1.5, at 22 
(2d ed. 1986). Punishment serves as a "weapon which society uses to prevent conduct which 
harms or threatens to harm" its interests. Id. The various interests that society seeks to 
protect include: 
protection from physical harm to the person; protection of property from loss, 
destruction or damage; protection of reputation from injury; safeguards against sexual 
immorality; protection of the government from injury or destruction; protection against 
interference with the administration of justice; protection of the public health; protection 
of the public peace and order; and the protection of other interests. 
Id. at 22-23. 
5. See, e.g., Christopher T .  Igielski, Washington Defendants ' New Right of PE-Trial 
Flight, 19 SEATTLE U .  L. REV. 633, 633-34 (1996) (asserting that "from a historical and 
practical viewpoint, a foremost purpose of criminal law is to serve the interest of the state 
in maintaining an ordered society and detemng future crime"); Ronald J. Rychlak, Society's 
Moml Right to Punish: A Furiher Explomtion of the Denunciation Theory of Punishment, 
65 TUL. L. REV. 299, 320-21 (1990). The article notes that 
[t]o maintain order in society, the legal system must not only provide for a safe society, 
it must also provide for a society that is satisfied with the workings of the system. The 
law-abiding populace must be assured that those who have done wrong are punished, 
and those who are innocent are protected. 
Id.; Kevin G .  McLean, Comment, The Propriety of Imposing Joint and Seveml Restitutionary 
Liability as a Condition of a Criminal Offender's Probation, 51 BROOK. L. REV. 809, 837 
(1985) (contending that "[tlhe primary purpose of the criminal law is to maintain social order 
through the prevention of conduct that society regards as, harmful. . . . [Tlhe criminal law 
is designed to protect the interests of the public at large."); Kurt M. Zitzer, Comment, 
Punitive Damages: A Cat's Clavicle in Modem Civil Law,  22 J. MARSHALL . REV. 657, 
674 (1989) ('The function of criminal law is to protect the interests of society by maintaining 
established standards of conduct. Therefore, criminal law protects society's inreresrs through 
the remedies of punishment and deterrence."). 
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dimini~hed.~ Punishing intentional or reckless behavior is commonly 
justified because individuals have chosen to engage in anti-social and 
morally blameworthy conduct.' Punishment for careless behavior is not 
justified unless society views negligent actors as sufficiently blameworthy. 
Society must also view the imposition of penal sanctions as a reasonable 
deterrent to the actor's conduct.' 
Although criminal law traditionally has focused its sanctions on harmful 
activity produced intentionally or recklessly, some courts and legislators 
have recognized that negligent conduct could act as a basis for criminal 
liability.g Negligence was a basis for criminal liability during the Industrial 
Revolution, when hazardous conduct threatened society's safety and 
spawned new regulatory crimes." Thus, negligent conduct that threatened 
health, welfare, and safety of food, drugs, housing, and working conditions 
became subject to criminal sanctions." Later, courts allowed proof of 
6. See, e.g., Jerome Hall, Negligent Behavior Should Be Excluded From Penal 
Liability, 63 COLUM. L. REV. 632, 641 (1963) (asserting that the theory of deterrence is not 
relevant to negligent offenders since they have not "thought of their duty, their dangerous 
behavior, or any sanction"); see infm text accompanying notes 21-23. 
7. See, e.g., HERBERT L. PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CFUM~NAL SANCTION 62-70 
(1968) (arguing that criminal culpability must be based on moral blameworthiness). Packer 
explained that in criminal law "there is the view that the only proper goal of the criminal 
process is the prevention of [conscious] antisocial behavior." Id. at 9. See also Tison v. 
Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 149 (1987) (asserting that the retribution theory of punishment 
requires that a criminal sentence be directly related to a defendant's personal blameworthi- 
ness); Chief Constable v. Shimmen, 84 Q.B. 7, 9-1 1 (1986) (finding defendant who broke 
a window when demonstrating one of the kicks used in the Korean art of self-defense to be 
guilty of criminal damage by recklessness; although the defendant believed he had taken 
enough precautions to eliminate or minimize risk, "[hle was aware of the kind of risk which 
would attend his act if he did not take adequate precautions"); Regina v. Faulkner, 13 L.R.- 
Cr. Cas. Res. 550, 555 (1 877) (finding that defendant's conviction for arson was quashed for 
lack of mens rea since the requisite showing was "that the accused knew that the injury 
would be the probable result of his unlawful act, and yet did the act reckless of such 
consequences"). 
8. See discussion infm Part 11. 
9. See discussion infm Part 111. 
10. See Francis B. Sayre, Public Werare Offenses, 33 COLUM. L. REV. 55,67 (1933) 
(maintaining that the development of crimes without a scienter requirement came into effect 
with the growing industrialization during the nineteenth century); see also Staples v. United 
States, 51 1 U.S. 600, 607 (1994) (noting that cases recognizing public welfare offenses 
"involve statutes that regulate potentially harmful or injurious items"). 
11 .  According to the public welfare doctrine, criminal prosecution can dispense with 
the necessity to show scienter in the enforcement of statutes that promote the public welfare. 
See, e.g., United States v. Park, 421 U.S. 658 (1975) (affirming the criminal conviction of 
a corporate president for breach of his duty to use care to maintain the physical integrity of 
the corporation's food products); United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277, 281 (1943) 
(noting that in areas subject to strong police regulation, the state may impose "the burden of 
Heinonline - -  65 Tenn. L. Rev. 878 1997-1998 
19981 CRIMINAL IZING NEGLIGENCE 879 
ordinary negligence to establish criminal liability whenever a person caused 
harm by using any inherently dangerous instrument,I2 such as death by a 
firearm.I3 Other jurisdictions expanded this broadened use of negligence to 
include any conduct that involved dangerous objects or activities which are 
likely to cause death or serious bodily ham.14 These cases conflict with the 
general principle that ordinary negligence, although actionable civilly, is not 
a sufficient ground for criminal liability. 
The modem technological revolution, however, requires legislators and 
policyrnakers to reevaluate the traditional reluctance of criminal law to 
punish ordinary negligence and to broaden the scope of punishable conduct 
to include ordinary negligent conduct when such punishment will deter 
others. Part I1 of this article discusses the role of deterrence in hrthering 
the overriding goal of criminal law-to protect society. It also answers 
critics who claim that negligent conduct is not capable of deterrence, and 
concludes that deterrence may be effective for any conduct when the 
legislature's expectation of individual conformity is reasonable. Part I11 
notes instances in which jurisdictions have deviated from the general rule 
that requires proof of intentional or reckless conduct to impose criminal 
liability. This discussion focuses on those jurisdictions that have used 
ordinary negligence to find criminal liability when a person uses an 
inherently dangerous instrument, engages in an inherently dangerous activity, 
or engages in conduct that poses a threat of widespread public injury. Part 
IV analyzes the appropriateness of permitting punishment based on ordinary 
negligence and concludes that it is entirely responsible to adjust criminal 
sanctions to respond to a fast-paced and technologically reliant culture that 
consciously trades due care for greater and swifter achievements. Part IV 
also offers a model for legislatures to follow when evaluating the appropri- 
ateness of criminalizing negligent conduct. Following this model will assure 
acting at hazard upon a person otherwise innocent but standing in responsible relation to a 
public danger"); United States v. Balint, 258 U.S. 250, 252 (1922) ("Many instances of this 
are to be found in regulatory measures in the exercise of what is called the police power 
where the emphasis of the statute is evidently upon achievement of some social betterment 
rather than the punishment of the crimes as in cases of mala in se."). 
12. See State v. Dixon, 186 S.E. 531 (S.C. 1936) (announcing that "[tlhere can be 
no question that it is the established rule . . . that one who causes the death of another by the 
negligent use of a deadly . . . instrumentality may be convicted of involuntary manslaugh- 
ter"); see also discussion infm Part II1.C. 
13. See State v. Gilliam, 45 S.E. 6, 7 (S.C. 1903) (declaring that when a homicide 
occurs with a firearm, it will interpret the term "negligence" in the homicide statute to mean 
"a failure to use ordinary care"); see also infra notes 94-99 and accompanying text. 
14. Conduct involving automobiles and drugs often threatens widespread public harm, 
as does conduct that violates environmental statutes. See, e.g., State v. Bonier, 367 So. 2d 
824, 825-26 (La. 1979) (defining "dangerous weapons" as those inshumentalities that, "in 
the manner used, [are] calculated or likely ro produce death or great bodily harm"); see also 
infm notes 103-22, 134-70 and accompanying text. 
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that legislatures will limit punishment to instances when there is a reason- 
able expectation that criminal sanctions will serve as a deterrent to future 
harm. This article draws the conclusion that criminal law will not unfairly 
punish individuals and will provide prosecutors with enhanced tools to 
respond to dangerously careless conduct that could have been anticipated 
and averted. 
Justice Holmes wrote that the true purpose of the criminal law is to 
coerce individuals to conform their behavior to societal norms.15 Typically, 
society achieves this desired conformity through punishment. l6 Punishment, 
15. See Oliver W .  Holmes, Jr., Theories of Punishment and the Ertemal Standard, 
in CRIME, LAW AND SOCIETY 27, 32 (Abraham S. Goldstein & Joseph Goldstein eds., 1971) 
(suggesting that the real purpose of criminal law and punishment is simply to coerce 
individuals to conform their behavior to the social conventions). For a discussion of those 
interests that society seeks to protect through criminal law, see LAFAVE & SCOTT, supm note 
4, 5 1.5, at 22-23. 
16. There are four generally accepted theories of punishment: retribution, rehabilita- 
tion, incapacitation and deterrence. Of these four theories, deterrence is the most appropriate 
theory on which to base punishment for negligent crimes. 
According to the theory of retribution, punishment is assigned as a vehicle to obtain 
revenge for the harms that the criminal caused to society as a result of his or her crime. See 
LAFAVE & SCOTT, supm note 4, 9 1.5(a)(6), at 25-27; see also SANFORD H .  KADISH & 
STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER, CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS PROCESSES 105 ( ~ T H  ED. 1995). 
JUSTIFICATION FOR THE RETRIBUTION THEORY OF PUNISHMENT IS THAT THE CRIMINAL 
DESERVES IT. LAFAVE & SCOTT, supm note 4, $1.5(a)(6), at 26. Since society places little 
emphasis on careless acts, retribution is not an appropriate theory on which to rely when 
punishing negligent conduct. 
Under the theory of rehabilitation, the purpose of punishment is to reform the offender 
so that he can return to society as a law-abiding citizen. See LAFAVE & SCOTT, supm note 
4, $ 1.5(a)(3), at 24; KADISH & SCHULHOFER, supm, at 119-225. Rehabilitation is aimed at 
reforming the individual so that he or she will no longer desire or need to commit crimes. 
LAFAVE & SCOST, supm note 4, $ 1.5(a)(3), at 24. Arguably, negligent crimes are 
committed because of the actor's failure to exercise due care. To the extent that one can be 
taught not to exercise poor judgment, rehabilitation is appropriate. However, because it is 
difficult to rehabilitate one who was merely careless, this theory is an inappropriate one on 
which to punish a defendant for a negligent act. 
Incapacitation requires removing the criminal from society for society's sake. See 
LAFAVE & SCOTT, supm note 4, 9 1.5(a)(2), at 23-24; KADISH & SCHULHOFER, supm, at 
126-30. Because incapacitation is designed to protect society from persons 'deemed 
dangerous because of their past criminal conduct, it is an inappropriate theory on which to 
base punishment of negligent conduct. 
Negligent actors are rarely a threat to society. According to the theory of deterrence, 
punishment is a means of preventing hture crimes. See LAFAVE & SCOTT, supm note 4, $ 
Heinonline - -  65 Tenn. L. Rev. 880 1997-1998 
CRIMINA LIZING NEGLIGENCE 
utilitarian theorists have argued, maintains societal order to the extent that 
it influences the future behavior of others.'' The theory of general 
deterrence assumes that punishment for a particular offense will prevent 
others from engaging in similar conduct because they will consciously avoid 
painful consequences.18 Under this theory, a judge assigns punishment to 
1:5(a)(l), (a)(4), at 23, 24-25; KADISH & SCHULHOFER, supra, at 115. Deterrence is divided 
into two categories: general deterrence and specific deterrence. !,AFAVE & SCOTT, supra 
note 4, (j 1.5(a)(l), (a)(4), at 23, 24-25. Under the theory of general deterrence, the judge 
sentences an individual to a particular sentence as a warning to-citizens that they are subject 
to the same liberty restrictions if they commit the same crime. Id. at 5 1.5(a)(4), at 24. 
"Punishment acts as a general deterrent insofar as the threat of punishment deters potential 
offenders in the general community." KADISH & SCHULHOFER, supru, at 115. Under the 
theory of specific deterrence, a judge assigns a particular sentence as a means of discouraging 
the individual from committing the crime again. LAFAVE & SCOTT, supm note 4, (j 1.5(a)(l), 
at 23. For the reasons discussed above, general deterrence is the best theory on which to rely 
when punishing negligent conduct. 
For a further discussion of the theories of punishment, see KADISH & SCHULHOFER, 
supra, at 102-3 1. 
17. See, e.g., JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS 
AND LEGISLATION I 1-13 (J.H. Bums and H.L.A. Hart eds., 1970) (1 823). In his explanation 
of the concept of "utility," Bentham wrote that 
[a] man may be said to be a partisan of the principle of utility, when the approbation 
or disapprobation he annexes to any action, or to any measure, is determined by, and 
proportioned to the tendency which he conceives it to have to augment or to diminish 
the happiness of the community: or in other words, to its conformity or unconformity 
to the laws or dictates of utility. 
Of an action that is conformable to the principle of utility, one may always say either 
that it is one that ought to be done, or at least that it is not one that ought not to be 
done. One may say also, that it is right it should be done; at least that it is not wrong 
it should be done: that it is a right action; at least that it is not a wrong action. 
Id. at 13. If the utilitarian goal is general deterrence, for example, a particular offender will 
be punished-not necessarily because he is guilty but because "it is believed that his 
punishment will cause other people to forgo criminal conduct in the future. . . . Others are 
put on notice of the risks of wrongful conduct." JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING 
CRIMINAL LAW (j 2.03[2], at 5 (1987). Fear of punishment encourages them to alter their 
conduct according1 y. Id. 
The utilitarian view is forward-looking; i t ,  assesses punishment in terms of its 
[likelihood] to modify the future behavior of the criminal and . . . of others who might 
be tempted to commit crimes. In its essence, [the utilitarian view] sees man as a 
rational, pleasure-seeking creature who can be prevented from engaging in antisocial 
behavior by the prospect that the pain it brings him will more than cancel out the 
pleasure. It relies, in a word, on deterrence. 
PACKER, supra note 7, at 1 1. 
18. See United States v. Bergman, 4 16 F. Supp. 496,499 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (asserting 
that "the aim of general deterrence . . . [is] to discourage similar wrongdoing by others 
through a reminder that the law's warnings are real and that the grim consequence of 
imprisonment is likely to follow"); see also BENTHAM, supm note 17, at 158 (noting that "all 
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Through deterrence, therefore, "individuals who are tempted by a particular 
form of threatened behavior will . . . refrain from committing the offense 
because the pleasure they might obtain is more than offset by the risk of 
great unpleasantness communicated by a legal threat."20 
The theory of deterrence rests on free will: one will weigh the criminal 
sanctions against the benefits derived from committing a particular crime.2' 
The notion of conscious choice makes deterrence particularly appropriate for 
intentional crimes, since those who have time to reflect on the nature of 
their acts will also have time to reflect on the consequences of their acts.22 
Indeed, few dispute that the deterrence theory of punishment is optimal for 
intentional crimes.23 
Whether the theory of deterrence can be applied to negligent conduct, 
however, has been the focus of considerable debate. Critics have argued 
that there is little deterrent value in punishing negligent acts since the actor 
is usually unaware of the risks attributable to his conduct.24 Because 
deterrence rests on the premise that would-be offenders balance pain and 
pleasure, the negligent offender comprehends neither the dangerousness of 
his acts nor the potential for any ~anction.~' Professor Jerome Hall argued 
ity. Id. at 252-54. In Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246 (1952), the Court finally 
expressed its respect for the concept of mens rea in criminal offenses. The Court 
distinguished public-welfare offenses from statutes that evolved from the common law. 
Morissette, 342 U.S. at 250-63. The Court observed that "wisely or not," legislatures usually 
dispense with mens rea in public-welfare offenses and that courts "not . . . without 
expressions of misgiving" had approved them. Id. at 256. In the case of more traditional 
offenses, however, the court noted that "mere omission . . . of any mention of intent will not 
be construed as eliminating that element from the [crime]." Id. at 263. As such, the holding 
in Morissette left sound the law of Balint regarding public welfare offenses. Furthermore, 
"it did not rule that legislatures could not abandon mens rea in common law based offenses; 
rather, it held that a requirement of mens rea would be presumed in the absence of a contrary 
legislative purpose." DRESSLER, supm note 17, $ 1 1.04, at 123. 
20. FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING, CRIME AND DELINQUENCY ISSUES: PERSPECTIVES ON 
DETERRENCE 3 (1971). 
2 1. See Hall, supm note 6, at 64 1. 
22. See sources cited supm note 17. 
23. See Daniel Fischel & Alan 0. Sykes, Cotpomte Crime, 25 J .  LEGAL STUD. 319, 
344 (1996); Hall, supm note 6, at 637; Michelle H. Kalenstein, Comment, Calculating 
Injustice: The Fixation on Punishment rn Crime Control, 27 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 575, 
655 (1992) (quoting Rep. William Hughes as saying, "the death penalty deters only 
intentional, knowing crimes and would therefore have no deterrent effect upon highly 
reckless conduct"); see also W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW 
OF TORTS 5 2, at 9 (5th ed. 1984) (explaining that punitive damages for intentional torts have 
the purpose of ''deterring others from following the defendant's example"). 
24. See BENTHAM, supm note 17, at 161; DRESSLER supm note 17, $ 10.04, at 102- 
03. See generally Hall, supm note 6. 
25. See BENTHAM, supm note 17, at 161. Bentham submits that punishment is 
inefficacious where an offender "intends not to engage, and thereby knows not that he is 
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that criminal law should not punish individuals for negligent conduct 
because "they have not in the least thought of their duty, their dangerous 
behavior, or any sanction." 26 He argued that the imposition of punishment 
would be meaningle~s.~' 
Professor Hall is concerned with the unfairness of punishing someone 
who causes inadvertent harm.28 Justice Holmes, by contrast, maintained that 
there is great utility in punishing the inadvertent actor as an example to 
others.29 According to Justice Holmes, it is entirely appropriate to "sacrifice 
about to engage, in the act in  which eventually he is about to engage." Id. 
26. Hall, supra note 6, at 641. Professor Hall is not convinced that the purpose of 
de tednce  is satisfied where one acts negligently. He recognizes that "[tlhe theory of 
deterrence rests on the premise of rational utility, i.e., that prospective offenders will weigh 
the evil of the sanction against the gain of the imagined crime." Id. He then points to the 
fact that this "goal" is inapplicable to those who act negligently, as such wrongdoers proceed 
without intent. Id. at 642. 
What could be more certain to undermine one's sense that it is important to avoid the 
intentional or reckless or negligent infliction of harm upon others than the knowledge 
that, if one inflicts harm, he may be punished even though he cannot be blamed for 
having done so? If we are to be held liable for what we cannot help doing, there is 
little incentive to avoid what we can help doing. 
PACKER, supm note 7, at 65. 
27. See Hall, supm note 6, at 643. 
28. See genemlly Hall, supm note 6. Professor Hall maintains that punishing an 
individual is "a very serious matter[, and that n]o one should be subject to punishment unless 
he or she has clearly acted immorally, i.e., voluntwily h m e d  someone, and unless a 
criminal sanction is both suitable and effective." Id. at 636 (emphasis added). Professor Hall 
asserts that there is no evidence to support the assumption that negligent individuals "are 
improved or deterred by their punishment or that of other negligent" actors. Id. at 642; see 
also PACKER, supm note 7, at 65 ("If we are to be held liable for what we cannot help doing, 
there is little incentive to avoid what we can help doing. One may as well be hanged for a 
sheep as a lamb."). 
29. Professor Hall fails to address the utility in punishing the inadvertent actor as an 
example to others. Professor Hall argues that "voluntury harm-doing is the essence of fault" 
and that "negligently caused damage, unlike voluntary wrongdoing, does not challenge the 
community's values as expressed in the penal. law." Hall, supm note 6, at 635, 637. 
However, Professor Hall does not address the effects on the future wrongdoer. Specifically, 
he does not account for the potential deterrent effect that punishment of a negligent actor 
may have on a future similarly negligent individual. Punishing the accidental actor serves 
as a useful warning to others to be more careful in their activities, thereby reducing the 
number of accidentally inflicted social injuries. See Richard A. Wasserstrom, Strict Liability 
in the Criminal Law, 12 STAN. L. REV. 73 1, 736-741 (1960). 
[I]t cannot be disputed that the threat of punishment necessarily deters. Even when an 
offender does not of his own accord realize that his conduct is wrongful, he can in many 
cases be made to take care. Coercion that causes the offender to pay attention can serve 
important social aims that would not be achieved by proscriptions that only come into 
effect when the transgressor recognizes the harm in his or her behavior. 
State v. Hazelwood, 946 P.2d 875, 883 (Alaska 1997). 
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the individual so far as ne~essary,"~' in order to "induce external conformity 
to the rule."31 While this approach may appear harsh and unfair, its utility 
lies in its capacity to reduce societal harm by encouraging, through the fear 
of punishment, compliance with societal rules.32 Thus, punishment for 
careless conduct will fortify notions that society discourages such conduct 
and will encourage people to take precautions to lessen the risks accompany- 
ing inadvertent beha~ior. '~ 
It is not necessarily appropriate for the legislature to provide criminal 
sanctions against negligent wrongdoers in all instances.34 When an actor 
merely engages in poor decision-making, there is nothing to alert the actor 
that he or she is making the wrong choice.35 However, to the extent that 
30. HOLMES, supm note 4, at 49. Justice Holmes viewed the criminal law as a means 
by which to shape social attitudes and mores. Id. He supported his theory of criminal law 
as protector by advocating punishment for simple negligence as a way to ensure that laws 
protect society to the fullest extent possible. See id. at 55-56. He provided an example: 
[I]f a workman on a house-top at mid-day knows that the space below him is a street 
in a great city, he knows facts from which a man of common understanding would infer 
that there were people passing below. He is therefore bound to draw that inference, or, 
in other words, is chargeable with knowledge of that fact also, whether he draws the 
inference or not. If, then, he throws down a heavy beam into the street, he does an act . 
which a person of ordinary prudence would foresee is likely to cause death, or grievous 
bodily harm, and he is dealt with as if he foresaw it, whether he does so in fact or not. 
Id. 
31. Id. at 49. Justice Holmes observed that "when men live in society, a certain 
average of conduct, a sacrifice of individual peculiarities . . . is necessary to the general 
welfare." Id. at 108. Thus, we punish the negligent actor in order to coerce more cautious 
conduct by society in general. Id. 
32. This position is very similar to the utilitarian position. The use of punishment 
serves to reduce crime because individuals usually act "rationally and hedonistically." See 
DRESSLER, supm note 17, 5 2.03, at 5. As such, those individuals "will act to increase 
personal pleasure and to reduce personal pain. The would-be criminal, therefore, will balance 
the benefits that will accrue from criminal conduct . . . against the pain of punishment." Id. 
The actor "will avoid criminal activity if the . . . potential . . . punishment[] outweighs the 
potential pleasure." Id. 
33. See, e.g., id. at 64. If people are to be deterred from engaging in criminal 
conduct by the punishment of those who have done so in the past, the imposition of the 
punishment must be certain. See id. A source of uncertainty, however, arises when persons 
who have engaged in criminal conduct are permitted to present excuses. See id. This is so 
because it is possible that false excuses may be presented and believed. See id. "The 
prospect that this holds out to others who may be contemplating criminal conduct results in 
'utilitarian losses'; therefore, the demands of utility require that excuses not be entertained." 
Id.; see also DRESSLER, supm note 17, 5 9.02, at 70 (noting that "[allthough the threat of 
punishment cannot deter actors during their involuntary conduct, their punishment may 
induce other persons similarly situated to take precautions to reduce the risk that they will 
act involuntarily . . . or will cause harm to others if they act involuntarily"). 
34. See. e.g., Hall, supm note 6, at 636. 
35. See supm notes 24-27 and accompanying text. 
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punishing a negligent actor will put others on notice that such carelessness 
should be avoided, punishment may achieve the goal of deterrence. 
Punishment for negligent conduct ceases to be appropriate when 
unfairness to the wrongdoer outweighs social It is the role of the 
legislature to determine where that point is reached, and the legislature 
should assign punishment to negligent crimes only when it can expect that 
punishment will assure individual c~nformity.~' Thus, the challenge for 
legislatures is to balance the potential unfairness in criminalizing uninten- 
tional and unknowing behavior against the likelihood of successfully 
deterring harmful behavior. 
111. LEGISLATIVE AND JUDICIAL SANCTION OF NEGLIGENT CONDUCT 
Legislatures and courts generally disallow criminal punishment for 
careless conduct, absent proof of gross negligen~e.~' Legislatures, through 
36. "Unjust punishment is, in the end, useless punishment. It is useless both because 
it fails to prevent crime and because crime prevention is not the ultimate aim of the rule of 
law." PACKER, supm note 7, at 65. "If we are to be held liable for what we cannot help 
doing, there is little incentive to avoid what we can help doing." Id. Packer believes that 
"losses must be weighed against the damage that will be done to the criminal law as canier 
of our shared morality unless its reach is limited to blameworthy acts." Id. 
37. See State v. Hazelwood, 946 P.2d. 875, 883 (Alaska 1997). 
38. See, e.g., LAFAVE & Scorn, supm note 4, $ 3.7(b), at 235; see also Fitzgerald 
v. State, 20 So. 966 (Ala. 1896) (defining criminal negligence as "such a departure from 
what would be the conduct of an ordinarily careful and prudent man under the same 
circumstances as to furnish evidence of that indifference to consequences which in some 
offenses takes the place of criminal intent"). Negligence, understood as an attitude of 
carelessness toward the consequences of one's actions, is commonly recognized as a 
culpability-creating condition. See Anthony M. Dillof, finishing Bias: An Examination of 
the Theoretical Foundations of Bias Crime Statutes, 91 NW. U. L. REV. 101 5, 1027 (1997). 
There are alternative conceptions of criminal negligence. See id. Indeed, the nature of 
criminal negligence and the degree to which it properly supports liability have long been 
debated. See, e.g., Lany Alexander, Reconsidering the Relationship Among Voluntaty Acts, 
Strict Liability, and Negligence in the Criminal Law, 7 SOC. PHIL. & POL? 84 (1990); Hall, 
supm note 6, at 635-43; Kenneth W. Simons, Culpability and Retributive Theory: The 
Problem Of Criminal Negligence, 5 J .  CONTEMP. L. ISSUES 365 (1994). Originally, both 
English law and American common law defined negligence as a failure to exercise ordinary 
care. See State v. Barnett, 63 S.E.2d 57, 59 (S.C. 1951). The purpose of the lesser standard 
of care was deterrence. See John L. Davis, The Development of Negligence as a Basis For 
Liability in Criminal Homicide Caw, 26 KY. L.J. 209,223 (1939). Many believed that the 
threat of civil liability was insufficient to prevent individuals from acting carelessly. See id. 
Society would be protected from the danger of careless individuals if it imposed criminal 
sanctions on those who failed to act as a reasonable person would in a similar situation. See 
id. In Rex v. Murphy, 49 Ir. L. T. Rep. 15, 208 (1914), the court instructed the jury that 
when determining the guilt of the defendant it would have to ask, "Would a reasonable 
[person] have done what this man d id? ' Id .  at 16, quoted in Davis, supm, at 222. 
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their capacity to draft statutes, are primarily responsible for defining criminal 
conduct.39 Most penal codes require that the careless conduct be substantial 
and likely to yield grave harm on the premise that the likelihood of serious 
harm includes a duty to refrain from activities that would cause such harm.40 
However, legislatures occasionally permit punishment based on ordinary 
negligence, primarily when the conduct is extremely dangerous and may 
cause harm to a significant number of pe~p le .~ '  
Concomitantly, these statutory enactments are subject to judicial review 
and interpretati~n.~~ In some instances, courts will review statutory language 
Eventually, both English and American courts adopted a stricter standard of proof for gross 
negligence or reckless misconduct for a conviction based on negligent conduct. Bamett, 63 
S.E.2d at 59; Davis, supm, at 222-23. The change was motivated by the conclusion of the 
Anglican Church that ordinary negligence was an insufficient ground for criminal conviction. 
See Davis, supm at 214. In addition, public opinion indicated a lack of support for criminal 
prosecution of an individual who failed to exercise ordinary due care because of a belief that 
the rule was too harsh. Bamett, 63 S.E.2d at 59; Davis, supm at 229. The courts concluded 
that basing criminal convictions on an error in human judgment is inhumane. State v. Young, 
56 A. 47 I, 475 (N.J. 1903). The Model Penal Code validates punishing a grossly negligent 
actor in section 2.02(2)(d). It provides the following: 
A person acts negligently with respect to a material element of an offense when he 
should be aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the material element exists 
or-will result from his conduct. The risk must be of such a nature and degree that the 
actor's failure to perceive it, considering the nature and purpose of his conduct and the 
circumstances known to him, involves a gross deviation from the standard of care that 
a reasonable person would observe in the actor's situation. 
MODEL PENAL CODE $2.02(2)(d) (1985). 
39. "'It is the legislature . . . which is to define a crime, and ordain its punishment."' 
Dowling v. United States, 473 U.S. 207, 214 (1985) (quoting United States v. Wiltberger, 
18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 76, 95 (1820)). The boundary between moral conduct and immoral 
conduct is generally defined by the legislature through the dictates of the applicable criminal 
law. As the branch most directly accountable to the people, only the legislature can validate 
the surrender of individual freedom that is necessary to form the social contract. The 
legislature, therefore, is the only legitimate institution for enforcing societal judgments 
through the penal law. See generally John Calvin Jeffiies, Jr., Legality, Vagueness, and the 
Construction of Penal Statutes, 71 VA. L. REV. 189 (1985). 
40. See infm Parts 1II.B-E. 
41. See discussion infm Part 1II.E. 
42. Although the legislature is primarily responsible for defining crimes, judicial 
intervention is often needed. The rule of lenity, which requires that penal statutes be strictly 
construed in favor of the defendant, developed in response to the "idea that courts should be 
reluctant to infer that a statute has wrought changes in rights, duties, and remedies beyond 
those that are effected by the statute's express terms." David L. Shapiro, Continuity and 
Change in Statutoy Interpretation, 67 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 921, 935 (1992). Customarily, courts 
have looked to this rule when interpreting ambiguous criminal statutes. See, e.g., United 
States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 347 (1971) ("'[A]mbiguity concerning the ambit of criminal 
statutes should be resolved in favor of lenity."') (quoting Rewis v. United States, 401 U.S. 
808, 812 (1971)). If the penal statute is unambiguous, then the rule of lenity is not 
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that requires criminal negligence and will interpret it to mean something less 
than gross negligence. Courts typically limit these instances to those in 
which the defendant engaged in conduct that was inherently dangerous or 
was likely to cause widespread public injury.43 
Thus, while legislatures are primarily responsible for determining when 
ordinary negligent conduct should be punished, the judiciary has played an 
important role in defining the appropriate boundaries of such punishment. 
Judicial interpretations of legislation aimed at sanctioning negligent conduct 
illustrate the varied, and often inconsistent, application of this degree of 
intent. Although legislatures have sometimes made it clear that the conduct 
they seek to punish involves an intent level almost synonymous with tort 
negligence, a review of the evolution of criminal negligence and the judicial 
interpretation of criminal statutes illustrate that it is the courts which have 
created a somewhat categorical approach toward criminalizing ordinary 
negligent conduct. 
A .  The Origin and Development of Criminal Negligence 
Ordinary negligence was sufficient for punishment in the early 
development of English criminal law.44 Eventually, the Anglican Church 
concluded that it was unfair to punish, at least criminally, without some 
measure of personal blamew~rthiness.~~ The Church, therefore, pressured 
applicable. See Beecham v. United States, 51 1 U.S. 368, 374 (1994). 
43. See infm.Parts 1II.C-E. 
44. See DRESSLER, supm note 17, 5 10.01, at 95. See genemlly Davis, supm note 
38. 
45. See Davis, supm note 38, at 214. At early common law, penalties were based on 
revenge. See id. at 209. The desire to extract such revenge arose whenever an individual 
was, in some way, linked to the injury of another. See id. Liability was founded on the end 
result, rather than on the intent or the negligence of the actor. See id. Thus, if X 
intentionally killed Y, Y's relatives killed X. See id. Similarly, if X accidentally killed Y, 
Y's relatives killed X. See id. "Still the blood feud must be satisfied. Vengeance must be 
had." Id. 
Hence, since the twelfth century, individuals have paid for any act resulting in the death 
of another, regardless of their mental state. See id. For example, if a man requests that his 
friend accompany him, and the latter is then attacked by his enemies while accompanying 
the former, the man who made the request is held liable. See id. at 210. Payment was owed 
civilly to the family and owed criminally to the king. See id. Davis notes that if two men 
were working on a tree and it fell and killed only one of them, the tree was given to the 
deceased's kindred for them to wreak vengeance on. See id. However, Davis also explained 
that punishment for a felony is handled solely by the king. See id. at 213. Originally, then, 
criminal responsibility was based solely on proof of the actus m - t h e  actor's state of mind 
was irrelevant. Beginning in the thirteenth century, however, English courts recognized the 
importance of mens ma to criminal liability and developed a body of law pertaining to it. 
See genemlly Francis Bowes Sayre, Mens Rea, 45 HARV. L. REV. 974 (1932). 
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the king to require proof that a defendant possessed some unacceptable 
mental state for any punishable crime.46 By the sixteenth century, an 
individual could not be convicted of a crime absent proof of something more 
than ordinary negligen~e.~' Eventually, Anglican courts expanded the 
requirement of proof of "some intent" to mean that a defendant could not 
be held criminally responsible absent proof of gross negligence.48 
As the American colonies began to decide issues of law independent of 
each other and of the crown, some permitted punishment for ordinary negli- 
g e n ~ e . ~ ~  However, most colonies adopted the strong Anglican belief that 
individuals should not be punished without proof of something more than 
a mere accident." Eventually, gross negligence became the minimum 
standard for criminal liability in the United States." 
By the twentieth century the concept of mens ma was so deeply entrenched in Anglo- 
American common law that the United States Supreme Court could state that "[tlhe 
contention that an injury can amount to a crime only when inflicted by [mens real is no 
provincial or transient notion. It is . . . universal and persistent in mature systems of 
law." 
DRESSLER, supra note 17, § 10.01, at 95 (quoting Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 
250 (1 952)). 
46. See Davis, supm note 38, at 214. 
47. See id. at 214-16. 
48. See id. at 218. By the nineteenth century, the prevailing English rule was that 
"[a] person on whom the law imposes any duty or who has taken upon himself any duty 
tending to the preservation of life and who grossly neglects to perform that duty or perfoms 
it with gross negligence and therapy causes the death of another person is guilty of 
manslaughter." Id. at 220. 
49. See id at 222. For example, in Rex v. Murphy, 49 Ir. L. T. REP. 15 (1914), the 
court ruled that the question for the jury was, "Would a reasonably careful milkman, 
reasonably sober, have done what this man did?Vd. at 16, quoted in Davis, supm note 38, 
at 222. This is more reminiscent of an ordinary negligence standard, as opposed to a gross 
negligence standard. 
50. For example, in Regina v .  Finney, 12 Cox's Crim. Cas. 625 (Oxford Cir. 1874), 
the court instructed the jury that "[tlo render a person liable for neglect of duty there must 
be such a degree of culpability as to amount to gross negligence on his part." Id. at 626; see 
also Tinline v. White Cross Ins. Ass'n, 3 K.B. 327, 330 (1921) ('The crime of manslaughter 
in a case like this consists in driving a motor-car with gross or reckless negligence. Ordinary 
negligence does not make a man liable for manslaughter."); Regina v. Noakes, 176 Eng. Rep. 
849, 850 (Lewes Crown Ct. 1866) (indicating that a greater degree of negligence is required 
to convict of crime than for civil liability). 
5 1. See Davis, supm note 38, at 224. In fact, the court in State v. Young, 56 A. 471, 
475 (N.J. 1903), stated that "our law is so humane that no man will be adjudged to be a 
criminal who merely e m  in judgment." Thus, the notion of criminal punishment requhes 
that there be proof of gross negligence for intent to commit a crime, rather than a mere error 
in judgment. See Davis: supm note 38, at 224. The Model Penal Code also reflects this 
standard. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(d) (1985). 
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By the end of the nineteenth century, a clear distinction had developed 
between the threshold mental state required for proof of a crime and that 
required for proof of a civil ~ r o n g . ' ~  Legislators continued to predicate 
minimum criminal punishment on "moral blameworthiness," which was 
equated with gross negligen~e.'~ However, an individual could be found 
civilly liable based on ordinary negligence.54 In general, then, an individual 
who was merely careless and thereby committed an accident could only be 
punished monetarily; there was no threat of loss of liberty." 
Despite the pronouncement by most legislatures and courts that criminal 
liability requires more fault than the ordinary negligence that is sufficient for 
tort liabilit~, '~ some states have retained the common law principle of 
52. See Davis, supm note 38, at 219. 
53. See id. "Gross negligence is the failure to exercise slight care." Id. When 
courts were asked to define the meaning of "slight care," they answered, "Slight care is that 
care which a person fails to exercise when he is guilty of gross negligence." Id. 
54. "[Ordinary] negligence is the failure to use that care which the reasonably prudent 
man would use under the same or similar circumstances. . . . It is not reckless and wanton 
misconduct." Id. 
55. See Roeder v. Fischer's Bakery, Inc., 188 N.E.2d 78, 80 (Ohio Ct. App. 1963) 
(involving an automobile negligence action for injuries in which the court held that violation 
of the reckless operation section of the code amounted only to prima facie negligence and 
not negligence per se); see also Bertrand v. Di Carlo, 304 A.2d 658, 660-61 (R.I. 1973) 
(involving a civil negligence action wherein plaintiffs sought recovery for fire damage to 
their property due to defendant's improper storing of flammable liquid). 
56. See, e.g., People v. Deskins, 927 P.2d 368, 375 (Colo. 1996); State v. Irvine, 52 
So. 567, 571 (La. 1910); State v. Yarborough, 905 P.2d 209, 213 P .M.  Ct. App. 1995); 
People v. Angelo, 221 N.Y.S. 47 (1927). Today, courts and legislatures define criminal 
negligence broadly. Some jurisdictions define the threshold for criminal culpability as a 
failure to exercise due care. See, e.g., Harless v. Oklahoma, 759 P.2d 225, 228 (Okla. Crim. 
App. 1988) (Parks, I., concurring) (noting that "the Legislature has defined criminal 
negligence as 'a want of such attention to the nature or probable consequences of the act or 
omission as a prudent man ordinarily bestows in acting in his own concerns"'). 
Several jurisdictions define criminal negligence as reckless, wanton, or flagrant conduct. 
See, e.g., Jones v. State, 439 S.E.2d 645, 648 (Ga. 1994) (defining malice as the "presence 
of an actual intent to cause the particular harm produced, or the wanton and willhl doing of 
an act with an awareness of a plain and strong likelihood that such harm may result") 
(emphasis omitted). A majority of courts follow the Model Penal Code definition, which 
defines criminal negligence as a failure to observe "a substantial and unjustifiable risk," such 
a failure of which is a "gross deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable person 
would" use in a similar circumstance. MODEL PENAL CODE $ 2.02(2)(d) (1985); see also 
People v. Torres, 634 N.Y.S.2d 354, 355 (1995). 
In People v. T o m ,  the court had to consider whether to dismiss an indictment against 
the defendant for criminally negligent homicide. 634 N.Y.S.2d at 355. Defendant left her 
two young children in a bathtub of running water. Id. at 354. She opened the faucet, 
allowing the water to run into the tub's open drain, and she warned the older child (three 
years old) not to block the drain. Id. ~eflndant  left the room and when she returned three 
to five minutes later, she found her daughter floating in the water. Id. In New York, a 
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permitting punishment based on ordinary negligence." Moreover, several 
jurisdictions have carved out exceptions to the majority rule.s8 These 
exceptions are generally limited to instances in which there is proof that a 
defendant carelessly handled an inherently dangerous instrument, carelessly 
engaged in an inherently dangerous activity?' or engaged in conduct that 
caused widespread public injury.* These jurisdictions recognize that when 
the consequences of a crime pose a more serious threat to the public, there 
is a greater justification to punish based on a lesser mens 
B. Penal Codes That Define Criminal Negligence as a Failure to Exercise 
Due Care 
Some state penal codes define minimum criminal culpability as a failure 
to exercise due care.62 In these states, defendants often are successfully 
person acts with criminal negligence when he fails to perceive a substantial and unjustifiable 
risk that such result will occur or that such circumstance exists. The risk must be of such 
nature and degree that the failure to perceive it "constitutes a grave deviation from the 
standard of care that a reasonable person would exercise in the same situation." Id. at 355. 
The Toms court found that the defendant was not guilty of criminally negligent homicide, 
as her conduct did not constitute such a grave deviation From a reasonable standard of care. 
Id. 
57. See, e.g., People v. McKee, 166 N.W.2d 688, 690 (Mich. Ct. App. 1968) 
(permitting "conviction of one accused of causing death of another by negligent operation 
of a motor vehicle upon proof of ordinary negligence without proof of gross negligence, 
criminal intent[,] or culpability"); Chandler v. State, 146 P.2d 598 (Okla Crim. App. 1944) 
(defining culpable or criminal negligence as the omission to do something that a reasonable 
or prudent person would do, or the doing of something that such person would not do under 
the circumstances surrounding the particular case). 
58. See infm Part 1II.B. 
59. See infm Parts 1II.C-D. 
60. See infm Part 1ll.E. 
61. See, e.g., LAFAVE & SCOTT, supm note 4, $ 3.8, at 244 ("Other things being 
equal, the more serious the consequences to the public, the more likely the legislature meant 
to impose liability without regard to fault, and vice versa"). In addition, "the greater the 
possible punishment, the more likely some fault is required; and, conversely, the lighter the 
possible punishment, the more likely the legislature meant to impose liability without fault." 
Id.; see also Staples v. United States, 51 1 U.S. 600, 616-19 (1994) (reasoning that the 
harshness of the penalty is a relevant consideration in deciding whether Congress intended' 
a strict liability crime); State v. Bash, 925 P.2d 978, 985 (Wash. 1996) (en banc). 
Although states permit punishment for civil negligence, the burden of proof in criminal 
trials remains beyond a reasonable doubt. See Paterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197 (1977). 
Moreover, as a general rule, a criminal cannot use defenses to charges for ordinary 
negligence, which are available to defendants in criminal trials. In tort law, a defendant may 
utilize comparative fault, contributory negligence or assumption of the risk doctrines in his 
or her own defense. 
62. See, e.g, NEV. REV. STAT. $ 193.018 (1997); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, $ 716 
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prosecuted for the types of accidents that might escape criminal prosecution 
in other jurisdi~tions.~~ Harless v. State64 illustrates the Oklahoma legisla- 
ture's willingness to punish actors for a lack of due care. In Harless, the 
defendant requested the court to instruct the jury that negligence means 
gross negligen~e.~' However, the court upheld a jury instruction defining 
negligence as merely a failure to exercise due care.66 At trial, the jury 
convicted the defendant of criminally negligent homicide for failing to seek 
medical care for her Testimony indicated that the defendant left the 
victim at home with her husband, Tony Da~is .~ '  Upon returning, Davis told 
her that the child had fallen and had been accidentally scalded in burning 
water.69 The defendant contended that she did not initially seek medical 
treatment for her child because Davis, who had "considerable first aid or 
paramedic training,"70 expressed no cause for concern since the child did not 
show any unusual symptoms from his injurie~.~' She and Davis decided to 
treat the child's injuries them~elves.~~ The defendant's son did not survive 
his injuries.73 
The State charged the defendant with second-degree manslaughter, 
which required proof of criminal negligen~e.~~ At trial, the defendant argued 
against a conviction since she relied on Davis's paramedic treatment and the 
absence of visible injuries when deciding not to call for medical assi~tance.~~ 
The judge instructed the jury that criminal negligence means the "omission 
to do something which a reasonably careful person would do, or the lack of 
the usual and ordinary care and caution in the performance of an act usually 
(West 1983); S.D. CODIHED LAWS $ 22-1-2(e) (Michie Supp. 1997). 
63. See, e.g., Harless v. State, 759 P.2d 225 (Okla Crim. App. 1988). 
64. Id. 
65. See id. at 227. 
66. See id. 
67. See id. at 226-27. 
68. See id. at 226. The defendant's husband, Tony Davis, although not the child's 
father, was a co-defendant. See id. He and the defendant were manied shortly before the 
accident but had previously lived together for quite some time. See id. The week before the 
day of the accident, Davis was the child's primary caretaker. See id. 
69. See id. Harless testified that Davis 'told her about the child's fall and about his 
alleged accidental burning in hot bath water." Id. 
70. Id. at 226-27. 
7 1. See id. at 226. 
72. See id. at 227. Four other doctors, however, testified that "the injuries were 
inconsistent with the explanations given by [the defendant] and Tony Davis." Id. 
73. See id. at 226. Eric Harless "was pronounced dead, the cause of death being 
anoxic brain injury which resulted from a blunt injury to the abdomen." Id. 
74. See id. at 227. 
75. See id. at 226-27. In contrast, the prosecution presented testimony of four 
doctors, all of whom noted that the child's injuries were inconsistent with Davis's story. See 
id. at 227. 
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and ordinarily exercised by a person under similar circumstances and 
 condition^."^^ The jury convicted the defendant, and she appealed, arguing 
that the judge should have defined criminal negligence as gross negligence 
rather than as ordinary negligen~e.~' 
The appellate court, citing the Oklahoma penal code's definition of 
criminal negligence, upheld the defendant's convi~t ion.~~ In a concurring 
opinion, Judge Parks wrote that although the Oklahoma courts require a 
showing of ordinary negligence for a conviction of second-degree homi- 
~ i d e , ~ ~  he would prefer that the legislature change the definition of 
negligence to something more than ordinary negligen~e.~' However, he 
acknowledged that the power to do so was reserved for the legislature.*' 
Despite Judge Parks's encouragement, which was echoed in a dissent by 
Judge Brett," the Oklahoma legislature has not amended its criminal laws 
76. Id. (citation omitted). 
77. See id. at 226-27. The defendant contended that the definition of culpable 
negligence given by the trial judge was "based upon a tort showing of ordinary negligence." 
Id. at 227. She believed that the instruction was deficient and did not reflect the appropriate 
degree of negligence that was required for an imposition of criminal sanctions. Id. Her 
requested instruction at trial, defining culpable negligence, provided that "YOU ARE 
FURTHER INSTRUCTED that 'culpable negligence' is more than simple negligence. It is 
the failure to perform an act when the facts and circumstances justify certain action. It is 
negligence that evinces a carelessness and a recklessness amounting to a callous disregard 
for the life of the victim." Id. 
78. Id. The court cited cases that upheld the definitional standard of culpable 
negligence that the trial court gave to the jury. See id. (citing Thompson v. State, 554 P.2d 
105, 107-08 (Okla. Crim. App. 1976); Crossett v. State, 252 P.2d 150, 159 (Okla Crim. App. 
1952)). The court also noted that the appellant's requested instruction was improper for the 
crime of second-degree manslaughter, but it would have been an appropriate request for a 
second-degree murder charge. See id. 
79. See id. at 228. He noted that "the Legislature has defined criminal negligence as 
'a want of such attention to the nature or probable consequences of the act or omission as 
a prudent man ordinarily bestows in acting in his own concerns."' Id. 
80. See id. "[Tlhis writer would strongly urge the Legislature to reconsider the 
current statutory definition of criminal negligence. . . and enact a standard which specifically 
provides that the standard of care for criminal negligence is higher than mere tort negligence 
. . . ." Id. 
8 1. See id. "[I] believe[] that culpable or criminal negligence should be specifically 
defined to require something more than mere ordinary or tort negligence . . . ." Id. "[[This 
Court can[not] redefine criminal negligence without improperly encroaching on the province 
of the Legislature." Id. 
82. See id. at 228-30. Judge Brett wrote that the defendant's conviction based on an 
ordinary negligence standard meant that the court was punishing her for "poor judgment." 
See id. at 230. The defendant's conduct, according to Judge Brett, did not meet the level of 
culpability required by what he believed was the appropriate definition of negligence. See 
id. Thus, he agreed with Judge Parks's concurrence insofar as it declared that the definition 
of culpable negligence was deficient. See id. 
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to reflect the majority rule that gross negligence is the minimum culpability 
South Dakota and Nevada are the only other states whose penal 
codes define the minimum mens rea for criminal liability as ordinary 
negligence." Under their state penal codes, any individual who violates any 
negligence statute can be punished if he or she "import[s] a want of such 
attention to the nature or probable consequences of an act or omission as an 
ordinarily prudent person usually exercises in his own business."85 In these 
few jurisdictions, the legislatures retain the historic principle that punishment 
is appropriate for any sanctioned conduct when a defendant fails to exercise 
due care and that proof of something more than tort negligence is unneces- 
sary for con~iction.'~ Defining negligence as ordinary negligence in the 
83. See OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, $ 716 (West 1983). 
84. See NEV. REV. STAT. $ 193.01 8 (1 997); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS $ 22- 1 -2(e) (Michie 
Supp. 1997). 
85. NEV. REV. STAT. $ 193.01 8; see also S.D. CODIFIED LAWS $ 22-1-2(e) (Michie 
Supp. 1997) (defining "negligently," and all words derived therefrom, as a "want of attention 
to the nature or probable consequences of an act or omission which a prudent man ordinarily 
bestows in acting in his own concerns"); Ray v. State, 189 P.2d 620, 624 (Okla Crim. App. 
1948) (citations omitted) (defining "culpable negligence," as used in OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 
2 1, $ 716 (West 1983), as the "omission to do something which a reasonable and prudent 
person would do, or the doing of something which such person would not do under the 
circumstances surrounding the particular case"). 
86. A crime is conduct to which the legislature has assigned a penalty. Thus, 
"[l]egislatures decide what is and what is not a crime." William J. Stuntz, Substance, 
Process, and the Civil-Criminal Line, 7 J .  CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 1, 1 (1996); see also 
John C. Coffee, Jr., Paradigms Lost: The Blum'ng of the Criminal and Civil Law Models- 
And What Can Be Done A bout It, 101 YALE L.J. 1875, 1878 (1992). The legislature 
predicates criminalization of particular conduct based on public policy and social mores. 
Prior to 1952, when the Model Penal Code was enacted, states ordinarily enacted criminal 
laws when the need to do so arose. See DRESSLER, supm note 17, $ 3.03 at 16. Laws were 
created to address sudden, sometimes passing, public perceptions of need. See id. The effect 
of these new "emergency" laws on the already existing criminal laws was often overlooked. 
See id. Thus, criminal statutory schemes were comprised of archaic, overlapping, and 
inconsistent laws. See id. 
In addition, because of the sudden and hasty enactments of these laws, they were often 
incoherent and lacked justification. See id. at 16-17. In 1962, a completed draft of the 
Model Penal Code was handed down. See id. at 17. It was a "carefully drafted set of 
crimes, defenses, and general rules of criminal responsibility not entirely consistent with the 
common law." Id. Between 1962 and 1984, thirty-four states, which were influenced by the 
Model Penal Code, enacted completely new criminal codes. See id. The Model Penal Code 
is a useful tool for each state legislature that is attempting to codify criminal conduct. 
Legislatures wield enormous power in determining against whom and when the government 
may seek penal sanctions since they may choose which socially abhorrent behavior to 
criminalize. Since each legislature has the power to define its own crimes, there is no 
requirement that the criminal definition of a particular conduct be consistent throughout the 
country. 
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penal code casts a broad net for punishment purposes, and therefore, puts 
others on notice that even simple negligence is intolerable. 
C. Penal Codes That Permit Punishment for a Failure to Use Due Care 
When Handling an Inherently Dangerous Instrument 
Early on, in circumstances when the careless handling of dangerous 
' weapons resulted in death, courts made an exception to the legislative 
requirement of gross negligence as the threshold for criminal behavi~r.~' 
When the defendant's careless use of an inherently dangerous weapon 
resulted in death, courts interpreted the legislature's criminal negligence 
language to mean ordinary negligence." In the early 1900s, courts 
expanded the exception to include instruments that are not inherently 
dangerous but can become dangerous with careless use, such as automo- 
b i l e ~ . ~ ~  Today, courts have extended the principle beyond automobiles to 
include many benign instruments, the careless use of which is likely to 
result in death or serious bodily injury.g0 
Courts permit punishment based on ordinary negligence when the 
defendant's conduct involves an inherently dangerous instrument because 
they presume that a reasonable person is aware of the substantial and 
unjustifiable risk of harm that could result from the careless use of a 
potentially harmhl in~trument.~' Courts note that the purpose of this 
exception is rooted in theories of deterren~e.~~ "Even when an offender does 
87. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Pierce, 138 Mass. 165, 178-80 (1884) (Holmes, J.); 
State v. McCalla, 85 S.E. 720 (S.C. 191 5); State v. Causer, 70 S.E. 161, 161-62 (S.C. 191 1); 
State v. Tucker, 68 S.E. 523, 524 (S.C. 1910); State v. Revels, 68 S.E. 523, 523 (S.C. 1910); 
State v. Gilliam, 45 S.E. 6, 7 (S.C. 1903) (ruling that one who causes the death of another 
"by the negligent use of a pistol or gun is guilty of [involuntary] manslaughter, unless the 
negligence is so wanton as to make the killing murder"). 
88. See sources cited supm note 87. 
89. See infra notes 105-22 and accompanying text. 
90. See infm notes 102, 104 and accompanying text. 
91. See, e.g., United States v. Zukrigl, 15 M.J. 798, 800-01 (A.C.M.R. 1983) 
(upholding conviction of negligent homicide for failure to ensure that soldiers engaged in a 
training exercise wore appropriate safety equipment); People v. Leffell, 249 Cal. Rptr. 906, 
907, 91 3 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988) (upholding defendant's conviction for vehicular manslaughter); 
Cable v. Commonwealth, 415 S.E.2d 218, 221 ( V a  1992) (holding that an experienced 
hunter knew of probable results of his negligent act). But see People v. Traughber, 439 
N.W.2d 231, 236-38 (Mich. 1989) (reversing the defendant's conviction of negligent 
homicide after deciding that he acted as an ordinarily prudent person would under similar 
circumstances). 
92. See, e.g., State v. Hazelwood, 946 P.2d 875, 883 (Alaska 1997). Explanations 
for objective fault crimes must have their origins in a theory of reasonable deterrence. Id. 
[I]t cannot be disputed that the threat of punishment necessarily deters. Even when an 
offender does not of his own accord realize that his conduct is wrongful, he can in many 
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not of his own accord realize that his conduct is wrongful, he can in many 
cases be made to take care."93 
By lowering the level of required intent from gross negligence to civil 
negligence for crimes involving inherently dangerous instruments or 
activities, legislatures give prosecutors a lower hurdle for obtaining convic- 
tions. In State v. ~illiam," the prosecution would have had difficulty 
proving that the defendant's mental awareness met a standard of gross 
negligence. In Gilliam, the defendant claimed to have accidentally fired a 
gun while he and his wife were playing.9s A jury convicted the defendant 
of murder for his wife's death.96 On appeal, the defendant argued that the 
trial judge erred when he instructed the jury that negligence in the 
manslaughter statute meant carelessness and not gross negligen~e.~' The 
South Carolina Supreme Court rejected the defendant's argument and 
affirmed his convi~ t ion .~~ 
The Gilliam court ruled that it would interpret the term "negligence" in 
a homicide statute to mean a failure to use ordinary care when death results 
from the careless use of a deadly weapon or ins t r~ment .~~  The Gilliam 
decision deviated from the general law in South Carolina that proof of gross 
negligence is a condition precedent to criminal punishment. Consequently, 
a conviction in the Gilliam case would allow the prosecution and the 
criminal system to use the defendant's punishment as a means to deter 
others from engaging in similar careless conduct. Thus, the Gilliam decision 
alerted South Carolinians that they must exercise, at a minimum, ordinary 
cases be made to take care. Coercion that causes the offender to pay attention can serve 
important social aims that would not be achieved by proscriptions that only come into 
effect when the transgressor recognizes the harm in his or her behavior. 
Id. 
93. Id. 
94. 45 S.E. 6 (S.C. 1903). 
95. Id. at 7. 
96. Id. at 6. 
97. See id. at 7. 
98. See id. at 7-8. The defendant argued that the trial judge erred when he instructed 
the jury that negligence in a manslaughter statute meant carelessness and not gross 
negligence. Id. at 7; see also State v. Goodson, 440 S.E.2d 370, 372 (S.C. 1994) (holding 
that failure to use ordinary care when handling a deadly weapon is inexcusable homicide). 
99. See Gilliam, 45 S.E. at 7. South Carolina defines criminal negligence as "the 
reckless disregard of the safety of others. A person charged with the crime of involuntary 
manslaughter may be convicted only upon a showing of criminal negligence as defined in 
this section." S.C. CODE ANN. 16-3-60 (Law Co-op. Supp. 1997). Criminal negligence, 
however, is not hrther defined in the section. See id.; see also DeLee v. Knight, 221 S.E.2d 
844, 846 (S.C. 1975) (stating that "what constitutes criminal negligence depends on the facts 
and circumstances of each case"); State v. Addis, 186 S.E.2d 415, 41 8 (S.C. 1972) ("In 
determining whether one has acted negligently or criminally negligent all of the facts and 
circumstances must be considered."). 
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care when engaged in the use of an inherently dangerous instrument or risk 
criminal prosecution. 
Initially, courts limited inherently dangerous instruments to firearms.'* 
Over time, however, the courts have expanded the definitionlo' to include 
items that, when handled with care, might not necessarily be considered 
dangerous.Io2 With this expanded definition, legislatures were allowed to 
circumvent their longstanding prohibition against punishment absent proof 
of gross negligence. 
With the evolution of the automobile as a staple of mainstream society, 
states began to recognize the potential for gross and serious bodily injury.lo3 
100. See, e.g., United States v. Johnson, 931 F.2d 238, 238, 240-41 (3d Cir. 1991) 
(affirming district court's finding that the use of a firearm accompanied by verbal threats 
constituted aggravated assault). 
101. 'The term 'dangerous weapon' is not limited to those instrumentalities which are 
inherently dangerous, but includes any instrumentality 'which in the manner used, is 
calculated or likely to produce death or great bodily harm."' State v. Bonier, 367 So. 2d 
824, 826 (La 1979). This doctrine is also well-demonstrated by the Federal Sentencing 
Guidelines which provide heightened punishment for crimes involving dangerous weapons, 
defined as "an instrument capable of inflicting death or serious bodily injury. Where an 
object that appeared to be a dangerous weapon was brandished, displayed, or possessed, treat 
the object as a dangerous weapon." U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL $ 1B1.1 
commentary at l(d) (1996). Although not exemplifying independent criminal conduct, the 
intent and effect are the same: the use of inherently dangerous instruments will, in itself or 
as an exacerbating factor of another underlying crime, impose or heighten criminal liability. 
102. See, e.g., United States v. Reese, 2 F.3d 870, 876-77, 890, 894 (9th Cir. 1993) 
(beating victim with flashlight considered use of excessive force); United States v. Williams, 
954 F.2d 204, 206 (4th Cir. 1992) (holding that a chair was a dangerous instrument); United 
States v. Slow Bear, 943 F.2d 836, 837 (8th Cir. 1991) (finding four-level sentencing 
enhancement for assault with a stick resembling a broomhandle); United States v. Young, 916 
F.2d 147, 152-53 (4th Cir. 1990) (holding that a homemade knife was a dangerous weapon); 
United States v. Big Crow, 898 F.2d 1326, 1328 (8th Cir. 1990) (deeming firewood a 
dangerous weapon); State v. Bash, 925 P.2d 978, 981 (Wash. 1996) (en banc) (determining 
that dog was dangerous). 
103. See genemlly W.J. Dunn, Annotation, What Amounts to Negligence Within 
Meaning of Statutes Penalizing Negligent Homicide by Opemtion of a Motor Vehicle, 20 
A.L.R.~D 473 (1968). See, e.g., People v. Pociask, 96 P.2d 788 (Cal. 1939); Rinehart v. 
People, 95 P.2d 10 (Colo. 1939); State v. Berkowitz, 186 A.2d 816 (Conn. App. Ct. 1962); 
Commonwealth v. Berggren, 496 N.E.2d 660 (Mass. 1986). 
Defendants have been convicted under an ordinay negligence standard where they failed 
to maintain a proper lookout, drove while fatigued, or even when they improperly entered 
an intersection. See, e.g., Rollins v. State, No. 14-94-00144-CR, 1996 WL 42040 (Tex. 
Crim. App. Feb. 1, 1996). In Rollins, the court instructed the jury as follows: 
Therefore, if you believe from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt, that the 
defendant[] . . . did unlawfully cause the death of [the victim], by criminal negligence, 
namely, by failing to stop his vehicle as required by law at a duly and legally authorized 
and existing traffic control sign, . . . or by failing to maintain a proper lookout for the 
vehicle occupied by the [victim], or by failing to yield the right of way to the vehicle 
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As deaths from careless automobile use occurred with increasing frequency, 
courts and legislatures identified the need to deter future harm for failure to 
exercise ordinary care while operating a motor vehicle.'04 Thus, although 
automobiles were not invented when courts first adopted the inherently 
dangerous instrument exception to the requirement of proof of gross 
negligence, courts eventually expanded the category to include them. 
In State v. ~ a r n e t t , ' ~ ~  the South Carolina Supreme Court concluded that 
ordinary negligence was sufficient for a homicide conviction resulting from 
the use of an automobile.lo6 The court was concerned about deviating from 
occupied by the [victim], and by any one or more of these acts caused his motor vehicle 
to collide with the motor vehicle occupied by the [victim] causing the death of the 
[victim], you will find the defendant guilty. 
Id. at *2. As a general rule, "[wlhere a statute penalizing negligent homicide by the 
operation of a motor vehicle describes the punishable misconduct in terms of 'negligence' 
without any modification or qualification being attached to such word, it has generally been 
recognized that the appropriate standard of culpability is ordinary negligence." Dunn, supm, 
at 476. See gene* Kevin Cole, Killings During Crime: Toward a Discriminating Theoty 
of Strict Liability, 28 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 73 (1990). 
[I]t is a misdemeanor for a person to operate a motor vehicle while impaired by drugs 
or alcohol, but if this conduct causes the death of a human being, the offense in some 
jurisdictions is elevated to the status of homicide. Most jurisdictions treat vehicular 
homicide more severely than the misdemeanor of alcohol-impaired driving, even though 
the actions and mental states of the defendant may be equivalent or identical. 
Id. at 76 n.8 (quoting David Crump & Susan Waite Crump, In Defense ofthe Felony Murder 
Doctrine, 8 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 359, 362 (1985)); see also Myles A. Kauffman, The 
Coming of Subsection (a)(5) of Pennsylvania's Dtunk Driving Law: '2 Statute with a Face 
Only a Prosecutor Could Love," 4 WIDENER J. PUB. L. 493 (1995); Katherine M. White, 
Note, Drunk Driving as Second-Degree Mutrier in Michigm, 41 WAYNE L. REV. 1433 
(1 995); JefFrey F. Ghent, Annotation, Validity and Consttuction of "Ertreme Indgference " 
Murder Statute, 7 A.L.R.5Tn 758 (1992). 
104. See sources cited supm note 103. 
105. 63 S.E.2d 57 (S.C. 1951). The defendant "was convicted of involuntary 
manslaughter. . . . [and] it was alleged in the indictment that the homicide resulted from 
criminal negligence in the operation of an automobile." Id. at 57-58. The trial court charged 
the jury that ordinary negligence was sufficient for a conviction. See id. at 58. The 
defendant alleged that gross negligence. or recklessness was the required showing for a 
conviction. See id. In rendering its decision, the court reviewed the principle behind 
reducing the appropriate level or required intent where accidents occur from the use of an 
inherently dangerous instrument. See id. at 58-61. The court concluded that "simple 
negligence causing the death of another is sufficient if the instrumentality is of such character 
that its negligent use under the surrounding circumstances is necessarily dangerous to human 
life or limb." Id. at 61. The court reasoned that the wle was appropriate because the failure 
to exercise "ordinary care in the handling of a dangerous instrumentality is the equivalent of 
culpable or gross negligence." Id. 
106. See id. at 62; see &so State v. Brown, 32 S.E.2d 825, 827 (S.C. 1945) (ruling 
"that one who uses an automobile on the highways without due care and caution (which is 
but negligence), and in violation of the statutes of the State, . . . and thereby causes the death 
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South Carolina's general requirement that the minimum intent element for 
a conviction of involuntary manslaughter was gross negligence."' To 
resolve this conflict, the court defined an automobile as an inherently 
dangerous instrument, thereby enabling the prosecution to prove only 
ordinary negligence in homicide prosecutions resulting from the careless use 
of an a~tomobile."~ Although the court did not approve of punishment for 
ordinary negligence, it found punishment justified "in . . . light of the 
potential danger involved in the lawful act being perf~rmed.""~ This ruling 
confirms the willingness of courts to abrogate long-standing principles in the 
interest of deterring future harmful behavior. 
Some legislatures, attempting to deter the harm that could result from 
careless automobile use, have codified the requirement that the prosecution 
needs only to prove ordinary negligence to convict in the case of an 
automobile accident."' For instance, Nebraska requires a driver to "exercise 
of a person, is guilty of manslaughter"); State v. Staggs, 195 S.E. 130 (S.C. 1938) (holding 
that ordinary negligence is sufficient to sustain a verdict of involuntary manslaughter for the 
negligent handling of an automobile); State v. Hanahan, 96 S.E. 667,668 (S.C. 1918) (ruling 
"that mere negligence is enough; that if a man is guilty of negligence in the handling of [an 
automobile], and death results from that negligence as a proximate result thereof, he is held 
guilty of manslaughter"). 
107. See Bamett, 63 S.E.2d at 60. 
108. Id. at 61. The court analogized automobiles to firearms in that they both are 
likely to cause harm, absent due care. See id. at 60-61. Thus, the court reaffirmed the 
State's rule that (1) the prosecution need only prove simple negligence when a defendant is 
engaged in the use of an inherently dangerous instrument and (2) an automobile is included 
within the definition. See id. at 62. The court mentioned its dislike for the standard but 
recognized a change or modification was not within its province; rather, any change should 
come from the law-making body. See id.; see also State v. Dixon, 186 S.E. 53 1 (S.C. 1936). 
In Dixon, the South Carolina Supreme Court considered, for the first time, the 
appropriate definition of negligence in a vehicular homicide case. 186 S.E. at 532-34. The 
defendant accidentally hit a telephone pole, killing one of his passengers. See id. at 531. 
At trial, the judge instructed the jury that it must convict the defendant of involuntary 
manslaughter if it found that the defendant acted with mere negligence while using a 
dangerous instrumentality or acted only with gross negligence. Id. at 531-32. The defendant 
was convicted and appealed, arguing that the judge incorrectly instructed the jury on the 
definition of negligence. See id. On appeal, the supreme court, after reviewing several cases 
involving the use of inherently dangerous instruments, held that an automobile was a deadly 
weapon or instrumentality, and therefore, ordinary negligence was sufficient to support the 
defendant's conviction. See id. at 532-33; see also Capra v. Ballarby, 405 P.2d 205, 207-08 
(Colo. 1965) (finding that automobiles are inherently dangerous instruments). 
109. Bamett, 63 S.E.2d at 59. 
1 10. See, e.g., CON. GEN. STAT. A N .  3 14-222a (West Supp. 1998) ("Any person 
who, in consequence of the negligent operation of a motor vehicle, causes the death of 
another person shall be fined not more than one thousand dollars or imprisoned not more 
than six months or both."); MICH. COMP. LAWS Ahw. 3 750.323 (West 1997) ("Any person 
who, by the operation of any vehicle upon any highway . . . at an immoderate rate of speed 
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due care to avoid colliding with any pedestrian upon any roadway.""' In 
State v. Mattan, ' I 2  the defendant was convicted of "unintentionally causing 
the death of [a pedestrian] while operating a motor ~ehicle.""~ Evidence at 
trial established that heavy rain and snow obstructed the driver's vision prior 
to impact.'I4 The jury convicted the defendant"' under Nebraska Revised 
Statute section 39-644,Il6 and on appeal, the defendant argued that the 
meaning of "due care" in the statute was unconstitutionally vague."' The 
Nebraska Supreme Court ruled that, according to the statute, "due care" 
equals ordinary negligence."* The court upheld the defendant's conviction 
since he violated his duty to maintain a proper lookout while dr i~ing."~ 
or in a careless, reckless or negligent manner, but not wilfully or wantonly, shall cause the 
death of another, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor . . . ."); NEB. REV. STAT. 4 60-6,109 
(1 993) (noting that "every driver of a vehicle shall exercise due care to avoid colliding with 
any pedestrian upon any roadway"). 
1 1 1 .  NEB. REV. STAT. 4 60-6,109 (1 993). 
112. 300N.W.2d 810(Neb. 1981). 
113. Id. at 812. 
114. See id. at 81 1. "It was overcast and dark at the time [of the accident] and traffic 
was heavy. Rain mixed with heavy snow was falling and the streets were 'slushy' but not 
slippery." Id. The defendant told a police officer that 
just as he got even with the crosswalk or shortly thereafter, he said he heard a thump. 
Then he said a split second later, he felt a bump on his tandem wheels. Then he said 
he had to pull down the street several feet, so he could see in his rear-view mirror as 
to see if and what he did hit. Then he said he saw the girl laying in the street, and so 
immediately, he pulled over to the curb, and got out. 
Id. 
115. Id. The court noted that "although the evidence was not as complete as it might 
have been, it was sufficient to permit [the jury] to find beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
defendant failed to exercise due care because he failed to see a pedestrian who was in plain 
sight." Id. at 812. The court pointed to the fact that the victim was "plainly visible to the 
eyewitness who saw the accident while she was walking on the sidewalk." Id. In addition, 
the court stated that after the defendant stopped his car, "he had no difficulty seeing the 
victim's body lying in the street." Id. 
1 16. NEB. REV. STAT. 4 39-644 (1 98 1) was recodified as NEB. REV. STAT. 4 60-6,109 
(1 993). 
1 17. See Maltan, 300 N.W.2d at 81 1, 813. 
1 18. See id. The court reasoned that the "definition of an act forbidden by statute, but 
not defined by it, may be ascertained by reference to the common law." Id. at 813 (citing 
State v. Eynon, 250 N.W.2d 658 (Neb. 1977)). "Due care is a well-understood term meaning 
the absence of negligence." Id. Therefore, "[tlhe defendant's contention that [the meaning 
of 'due care'] is unconstitutionally vague is without merit." Id. 
1 19. See id. 
The rule is well established in this state that a driver must keep a lookout so that he can 
see what is plainly visible in front of him, and a failure to do so is negligence as a 
matter of law. The presence of snow or other conditions which interfere with visibility 
require the driver to use care commensurate with the situation. 
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Thus, the Nebraska court concluded that anything less than ordinary care 
while driving is intolerable, thereby giving notice to others that they must 
exercise ordinary care to avoid p~nishment. '~~ 
Today, inherently dangerous instruments encompass more than 
automobiles and fuearms.12' The category of inherently dangerous instru- 
ments has been broadened to include many other objects that courts and 
legislatures have determined are likely to produce harm.'22 Permitting 
punishment based on proof of ordinary negligence for harm resulting from 
the use of an inherently dangerous instrument is imperative to deter 
dangerous behavior. 
D. Penal Codes That Pennit Punishment for a Fm'lure to Exercise Due 
Cme When Engaged in an Inherently Dangerous Activity 
Proof that a defendant knew or should have known that he or she was 
engaged in an inherently dangerous activity likely to cause death or serious 
bodily harm has supported a conviction for criminally negligent homicide. 
In People v.  Cru~ian i , '~~  a New York court considered whether the 
defendant's act of injecting a fatal overdose of heroin into the body of 
another was an inherently dangerous act that supported indictments for 
second degree manslaughter and criminally negligent h0mi~ide.I~~ Although 
the New York Penal Code defines criminal negligence as "fail[ing] to 
perceive a substantial and unjustifiable risk that [a harmful] result will 
Id. The court reasoned that since the evidence proved that the defendant did not see the 
pedestrian until after he hit her with his vehicle, the driver was not keeping a proper lookout, 
and thus failed to exercise due care. See id. at 8 12. 
120. Seeid. at813. 
12 1 .  See supm notes 100-02 and accompanying text. 
122. See, e.g., People v. Cruciani, 334 N.Y.S.2d 515, 521-22 (Suffolk County Ct. 
1972) (holding that a defendant can be convicted of criminally negligent homicide for 
injecting heroin into another if he knew or should have known that the heroin was likely to 
cause h k n  to the deceased); see also supm notes 101-02 and accompanying text for other 
inherently dangerous instruments andlor activities. 
123. 334 N.Y.S.2d 5 15 (Suffolk County Ct. 1972). 
124. Id. at 521-23. N.Y. PENAL LAW 9 125.10 (McKinney 1998) provides that a 
"person is guilty of criminally negligent homicide when, with criminal negligence, he causes 
the death of another person." In Cruciani, the defendant, a heroin addict, assisted his friend, 
the deceased, in injecting heroin into her arm. See 334 N.Y.S.2d at 517. Specifically, when 
the deceased anived at the defendant's home, she had been "high on 'downs,' and, as a 
matter of fact, 'she could not walk or talk straight."' Id. The defendant left his apartment 
for a while, and upon his return, he found his friend trying to inject heroin into her arm with 
a syringe and needle. See id. When he noticed that the deceased was having difficulty, he 
"proceeded to assist her, and actually injected the heroin into her arm.'' Id. She subsequent- 
ly died from an overdose. See id. at 5 18. 
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occur,"'25 an appellate court upheld the trial judge's instructions that 
permitted a conviction if the defendant knew or should have known that the 
injection could result in a drug 0verd0se.l~~ 
The Cruciani decision illustrates that proof of conviction based on a 
lesser mens rea may be appropriate to ensure punishment for deterrence 
The court cited staggering statistics regarding the dangers of 
heroin and wrote of its desire to curb future deaths resulting from drug 
abuse. IZ8 The court's analysis indicated a strong desire to extend the 
definition of criminal negligence to its outermost limits as a means to legally 
uphold the defendant's con~ict ion. '~~ Although the court was bound by the 
statutory definition of criminal negligence, the court wrote that proof of such 
negligence might be only slightly higher than simple negligence.l3' 
In affirming the trial judge's instructions, the appellate court held that 
if a defendant engaged in an inherently dangerous activity, the prosecution 
could then prove a substantial and unjustifiable risk if the defendant knew 
or should have known that the activity could cause death.13' The language 
~ 
125. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 15.05(4) (McKinney 1998); see also id. 9 125.10. 
126. See People v. Cruciani, 353 N.Y.S.2d 8 1.1, 8 13 (N.Y. App. Div. 1974). 
127. See id. at 8 12- 13. The trial court noted that there were a number of factual 
findings that the jury had to consider in determining "whether the defendant's acts constituted 
a substantial and unjustifiable risk of death." Cmciani, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 523. The court 
enumerated the following seven issues: 
(1) Was the injection intravenous or subcutaneous?; (2) Was the deceased 'high' on 
barbiturates at the time the defendant injected her with heroin?; (3) Did [the] defendant 
know, or should he have known, under the circumstances, that the deceased was 'high' 
on barbiturates at the time of injecting her with heroin?; (4) Did the defendant supply 
the deceased with the heroin or the implements to administer the heroin?; (5) Did [the] 
defendant know, or should he have known, under the circumstances, the quantity or 
quality of heroin he was injecting into deceased's body?; (6) Did the defendant know, 
or should he have known, under the circumstances, whether the deceased had developed 
a tolerance for heroin?; [and] (7) Did the defendant know, or should he have known, 
under the circumstances, whether the quantity he injected was the deceased's regular 
dosage? 
Id. The court then concluded that "the consumption of heroin in unknown strength is 
dangerous to human life, and the administering of such a drug is inherently dangerous and 
does cany a high probability that death will occur." Id. 
128. See id. at 520-21. The court noted that "heroin is the single leading cause of 
death of adolescents and young adults from the ages of fifteen to thirty-five in the 
Metropolitan New York area." Id. at 520. Half of those deaths involve teenagers. See id. 
It hrther noted that heroin abuse accounts for one percent of the deaths among addicts per 
year. See id. 
129. See id. at 521-23. 
130. See id. "Where casual, or slight negligence ends, and gross negligence begins 
may be difficult to determine, but essentially the issue is predominantly one of fact and not 
of law." Id. at 522. 
131. See Cruciani, 353 N.Y.S.2d at 812-13; see also People v. Hopkins, 226 P.2d 74, 
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"knew or should have known" is typically used when instructing the jury on 
ordinary negligence.I3' Where defendant's negligent activity is dangerous 
to the public, some jurisdictions will permit proof of ordinary negligence, 
or something just slightly higher than ordinary negligence, to ensure 
prosecution. '33 
76-77 (Cal. Ct. App. 1951). 
132. See, e.g., Ctuciani, 353 N.Y.S.2d at 812-13. The court, in affirming the lower 
court, noted that 
the proof established that the risk of death is substantially increased when heroin is 
injected into the body at a time when the central nervous system is already depressed 
as the result of the consumption of barbiturates and that this was known by defendant. 
The jury could therefore find that defendant acted recklessly, since he was aware of and 
consciously disregarded a substantial and unjustifiable risk . . . . 
Id. at 8 13 (emphasis omitted). Several other cases have held that the act of injecting heroin 
into another's body is an inherently dangerous act. See, e.g., People v. Poindexter, 330 P.2d 
763, 767 (Cal. 1958) (finding that "taking a shot of heroin was an act dangerous to human 
life"); Brown v. Commonwealth, 293 S.W. 975, 976-77 (Ky. 1927) (finding that decedent's 
death was caused by the careless administration of morphine). 
133. See Beran v. State, 705 P.2d 1280, 1284 (Alaska Ct. App. 1985) (relying on 
proof of ordinary negligence unless otherwise noted by the legislature); Reynolds v. State, 
655 P.2d 13 13, 13 15 (Alaska Ct. App. 1982) (requiring negligence to accompany defendant's 
conduct); Silver v. State, 79 S.E. 919, 920 (Ga Ct. App. 1913) (noting the application of due 
caution and circumspection); People v. Datema, 533 N.W.2d 272, 277 (Mich. 1995) 
(premising involuntary manslaughter on criminal negligence); Ctuciw~i, 353 N.Y.S.2d at 8 13 
(permitting proof of recklessness). The United States Supreme Court has permitted proof of 
ordinary negligence in some cases to ensure prosecution: 
While the general rule at common law was that the scienter was a necessary element 
in the indictment and proof of every crime, and this was followed in regard to statutory 
crimes even where the statutory definition did not in terms include it, there has been a 
modification in this view in respect to prosecutions under statutes the purpose of which 
would be obstructed by such a requirement. . . . [I]n the prohibition or punishment of 
particular acts, the State may in the maintenance of a public policy provide "that he who 
shall do them shall do them at his peril and will not be heard to plead in defense good 
faith or ignorance." Many instances of this are to be found in regulatory measures in 
the exercise of what is called the police power where the emphasis of the statute is 
evidently upon achievement of some social betterment rather than the punishment of the 
crimes as in cases of mala in se. . . . Again where one deals with others and his mere 
negligence may be dangerous to them, . . . the policy of the law may, in order to 
stimulate proper care, require the punishment of the negligent person though he be 
ignorant of the noxious character of what he sells. 
United States v. Balint, 258 U.S. 250, 251-52 (1922) (citations omitted); see also United 
States v. International Minerals & Chem. Corp., 402 U.S. 558, 565 (1971) (citing Balint and 
noting that "where . . . dangerous or deleterious devices or products or obnoxious waste 
materials are involved, the probability of regulation is so great that anyone who is aware that 
he is in possession of them or dealing with them must be presumed to be aware of the 
regulation"). The inherently dangerous instrument doctrine is also used in civil law. See. 
e.g., Pettingell .v. Moede, 271 P.2d 1038, 1044 (Colo. 1954) (en banc) (stating in the jury 
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E. Penal Codes That Permit Punishment for a Failure to Exercise Due 
Care When Engaged in Conduct That Threatens Widespread 
fiblic Injury 
Legislatures have carved out exceptions-to the majority rule that criminal 
culpability should be predicated on gross negligence by statutorily defining 
the undesired harm in a regulatory crime or by statutorily defining a specific 
behavior that threatens widespread public When the statutory 
meaning of negligence is unclear, courts have followed suit by interpreting 
these statutes with a view toward facilitating successful  prosecution^.'^^. 
These exceptions are largely rooted in the legislative response to the 
Industrial Revolution when lawmakers found that the only way to deter 
certain harm was to define crimes in a way that would ensure successful 
prose~ution.'~~ Hence, legislatures began defining crimes without any mens 
instruction that "if defendant 'was conscious of his conduct' and knew or should have known 
that to continue therein would naturally and probably result in injury, he may be held liable. 
Such language is perfectly consistent with simple negligence."). 
134. Public welfare offenses encompass a broad range of activities. These offenses 
include environmental violations, sexual exploitation of a minor, and animal neglect. See, 
e.g., State v. White, 464 N.W.2d 585 (Mim. Ct. App. 1990) (concerning the sexual 
exploitation of a minor); State v. Marshall, 821 S.W.2d 550, 551-52 (Mo. Ct. App. 1991) 
(interpreting a statute concerning the protection of animals); William B. Johnson, Annotation, 
Validity. Construction, and Application of State Hmanlous Waste Regulations, 86 A.L.R.~TH 
401 (1991) (discussing an environmental statute that imposes criminal liability for ordinary 
negligence). Driving while intoxicated is also a public welfare offense. See Christopher H. 
Hall, Annotation, Validiry. Construction, and Application of Statutes Directly Proscribing 
Driving with Blood-Alcohol Level in Ercess of Established Percentage, 54 A.L.R.4m 149 
(1987). Finally, possession of an unregistered shotgun has been described as a public welfare 
offense. See, e.g., State v. Harnlin, 497 So. 2d 1369 (La. 1986) (finding the state gun 
registration law constitutional). 
135. For cases in which the defendant challenged the pertinent drunk driving statutes 
as being unconstitutionally vague, see Lovell v. State, 678 S.W.2d 3 18 (Ark. 1984); Roberts 
v. State, 329 So. 2d 296 (Fla 1976); People v. Ziltz, 455 N.E.2d 70 (Ill. 1983); Finney v. 
State, 491 N.E.2d 1029 (Ind. Ct. App. 1986); State v. D'Agostino, 495 A.2d 915 (N.J. Super. 
Ct. Law Div. 1984); State v. Rose, 323 S.E.2d 339 (N.C. 1984); State v. Tanner, 472 N.E.2d 
689 (Ohio 1984); State v. Abbot, 514 P.2d 355 (Or. Ct. App. 1973); Commonwealth v. 
Mikulan, 470 A.2d 1339 (Pa 1983); State v. Franco, 639 P.2d 1320 (Wash. 1982) (en banc). 
In each case, the respective court upheld the constitutionality of the statute and the 
defendant's conviction. 
136. During the mid-nineteenth century, in response to the Industrial Revolution and 
society's increasingly complex technology and social frenzy, a class of crimes emerged called 
public welfare crimes. See Sayre, supm note 10, at 56-67. Public welfare crimes were 
crimes in which there was a compelling need to protect society against harm. See id. 
Violation of these offenses could be proven absent any mens ma when the legislature found 
that there was a compelling need to protect society against harm. See id. at 61-62. The court 
and legislative responses rejected proof of some mental element for punishment in order to 
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rea element.13' Today, some courts and legislatures have retreated from the 
notion of imposing punishment without a mental element and have included 
a mens rea of ordinary negligence in regulatory crimes.'38 By requiring 
proof of ordinary negligence, courts and legislatures have protected society 
from the harm that regulatory crimes seek to deter without permitting 
convictions absent any mens rea. 
In United States v. Fvezzo Brothers, I ~ c . , ' ~ ~  the Third Circuit considered 
whether the Congress intended the negligence provision of the Clean Water 
Act140 to mean ordinary negligence.I4' The government charged the 
defendants with violating the Act when pollutants appeared after heavy rain 
 period^.'^' At trial, the judge instructed the jury that the defendants could be 
found guilty of violating the Act if they failed to use due care in discharging 
potential pollutants into the point ~0urce . I~~  The jury convicted the 
 defendant^,'^^ who on appeal argued that the judge erred by failing to 
require a special verdict to determine whether the violation was willful or 
ensure deterrence. See genemlly id. 
137. See, e.g., id. at 70-75. 
138. See, e.g., Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. $5 1251-1376 (1982 & Supp. V 1987); 
Ocean Dumping Act, 33 U.S.C. $5 1401-1445 (1982 & Supp. V 1987); Safe Drinking Water 
Act, 42 U.S.C. $§ 300f-300j-10 (1982 & Supp. V 1987). See genemlly Eva M .  Fromm, 
Commanding Respect: Criminal Sanctions for Environmental Crimes, 21 ST. MARY'S L.J. 
821 nn.136-84 (1990). If certain provisions of the Clean Water Act are violated as a result 
of negligence, a first violation results in a misdemeanor conviction. See 33 U.S.C. $ 
1319(c)(l). A "negligence" conviction could result in a fine of up to $25,000 per day, or 
imprisonment for up to one year. See id.; see also Jeffrey Miller, Discourse on a Dead 
Duck: Decoding Strict Criminal Liability for Federal Public Welfare Offenses (Feb. 1998) 
(unpublished manuscript, on file at Pace University School of Law). 
139. 602 F.2d 1 123 (3d Cir. 1979). 
140. 33 U.S.C. $ 1319(c)(l). 
14 1. Frezzo Bros., Inc., 602 F.2d at 1 129. 
142. See id. at 1125. The government also alleged that the discharges were willhl; 
it supported its claim by showing that the waste appeared at a time when there had been no 
rain. See id. at 1129. A county health department inspector noticed that manure waste was 
flowing into a nearby creek where there had not been any recorded rainfall. See id. at 1125. 
He began to investigate the defendants and went to their farm to inspect their existing water 
pollution abatement facilities. See id. The investigator returned two additional times, once 
following a morning of heavy rain. See id. During the first visit, the investigator brought 
several witnesses with him; they observed the holding tank overflowing into the stream. See 
id. James Frezzo admitted to the investigator that the "tank could control the water only 
95% of the time." Id. After the second visit, samples were again drawn which showed high 
levels of pollutant concentration. See id. Upon completion of the investigation, the 
defendants were indicted for violations of the Clean Water Act. Id. at 1124-25. The 
enforcement provisions of the Act are contained in 33 U.S.C. $ 1319. 
143. See United States v. Frezzo Bros., Inc., 461 F. Supp. 266, 272 (E.D. Pa 1978). 
144. Id. at 268. 
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negligent.14' The appellate court upheld the conviction and implied that a 
reasonable person would have known that there was a likelihood of 
~pi1lage.l~~ By upholding the conviction based upon the reasonableness 
standard,14' the court warned the public to take caution when engaging in 
activities that are potentially hazardous to water sources. The application 
of an ordinary negligence standard permitted the prosecution greater leeway 
for conviction, thereby assuring more deterrent value in the defendant's 
punishment. 14' 
State courts have also interpreted regulatory crimes to impose punish- 
ment based on proof of civil negligence. In People v.  arti in,'^^ the 
California Court of Appeals considered the appropriate definition of 
negligence for the California Hazardous Waste Control ~c t . " '  The 
defendant directed his employees to transport barrels containing waste.ls' 
During transportation, some barrels were accidentally smashed, and their 
contents spilled to the ground.''* At trial, the judge instructed the jury that 
it could convict the defendant if it found that he "reasonably should have 
known that he was disposing or causing the disposal of or transporting or 
causing the transportation of hazardous waste."ls3 The defendant argued that 
145. Frezzo Bros., Inc., 602 F.2d at 1 129. 
146. See id. The government did not institute a civil action before commencing 
criminal proceedings. This was common practice at the time. See id. at 1126. 
147. See id. at 1 129-30. 
148. In United States v. A hmud, 101 F.3d 386 (5th Cir. 1996), the Fifth circuit 
indicated that it would concur with the Third Circuit's decision in Frezzo Brothers reading 
"negligence" in the CWA to mean ordinary negligence. Id. at 386. In A hmud, a federal jury 
convicted a defendant of "knowingly discharging a pollutant from a point source into a 
navigable water of the United States without a permit, in violation of 33 U.S.C. 9 1317(d) 
and 33 U.S.C. 5 13 19(c)(2)(a)." Id. Evidence at trial showed that defendant's employees 
discharged contaminated fluid into a sanitary sewer system intake pond. See id. at 388. Over 
the defendant's objection, the judge instructed the jury on the count of knowingly discharging 
hazardous waste in' violation of 33 U.S.C. 5 13 1 1 (a) and 33 U.S.C. 5 13 19(c)(2)(a). Id. at 
389. The Fifth Circuit had to consider whether the jury instructions adequately informed the 
jury that it could convict the defendant if the jury found that the defendant negligently left 
the pump in the hands of his employees. See id. at 389. The court found that the defendant 
would have acted only negligently if he "thought water, rather than gasoline, was being 
discharged." Id. at 393. Thus, he was only negligent if he was unaware that what he was 
discharging was a pollutant. See id. at 390. Thus, according to the court, the jury could 
have found the defendant guilty of negligently discharging contaminated fluid into a sanitary 
sewer system intake pond, even if he was unaware of the potential hazard, as long as a 
reasonable person would have been aware of the potential for harm. See id. 
149. 259 Cal. Rpe. 770 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989). 
150. The Act prohibits disposing of hazardous waste and "affixes criminal liability for 
violation of a standard of ordinary care." See id. at 771. 
15 1. See id. 
152. See id. at 772. 
153. Id. at 776. 
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the instruction allowed conviction based on proof of civil negligence and 
that California required proof of gross negligence for conviction of a 
crime.ls4 In upholding the .conviction, the court ruled that proof of civil 
negligence was permissible in this instance since violation of the Hazardous 
Waste Control Act is a regulatory  rime.''^ 
Some courts have followed the federal and state legislative lead and 
have held that "criminal convictions may be predicated on findings of 
simple or ordinary negligence only when the offense involves a heavily 
regulated commercial activity." Most recently, the Supreme Court of 
Alaska, in State v. ~ a z e l w o o d , ' ~ ~  upheld a conviction based on ordinary 
negligence for the negligent discharge of oil from the Exxon Valdez 
incident."' At trial, the judge instructed the jury on a civil negligence 
standard of culpability.'58 The defendant was con~icted,"~ and on appeal, 
he argued that the court should have instructed the jury on a gross 
negligence standard.l6O The Supreme Court of Alaska upheld the instruction 
154. See id. The defendant asked the court to instruct the jury that whether he 
"reasonably should have known" about the disposal or transportation "must be measured 
against a criminal negligence standard of care, i.e., that the defendant exhibited a gross 
indifference to the consequences of his acts with a reckless, gross, or culpable departure from 
the ordinary standard of care, or with gross or reckless disregard for the consequences of his 
acts." Id. 
155. See id. at 779. There is no doubt that the legislature in this instance "intended 
to impose criminal liability upon those who reasonably should have known they were 
transporting or disposing of hazardous waste at an unpermitted facility." Id. "We conclude 
that [the statute], although not a strict liability offense, is part of a regulatory scheme where 
it is permissible to find criminal liability based on the violation of a standard of ordinary 
care." Id. 
156. 946 P.2d 875 (Alaska 1997). . 
157. Id. at 886. The captain of the Exxon Valdez, Joseph Hazelwood, ran his ship 
aground, eventually spilling eleven million gallons into Prince William Sound. Id. at 887. 
Further investigation revealed that Hazelwood was intoxicated at the time of the spill; and 
a jury convicted Hazelwood of negligent discharge of oil. See Hmelwood, 912 P.2d at 1277. 
The court of appeals reversed Hazelwood's conviction, holding that he should have been tried 
under a criminal negligence theory rather than a civil negligence standard of culpability. Id. 
at 1279-80. The Supreme Court subsequently reversed. See Hmelwood, 946 P.2d at 886. 
158. Hmelwood, 912 P.2d at 1278. Over Hazelwood's objection, the court instructed 
the jury: 
A person acts "negligently" with respect to a result described by a provision of law 
defining an offense when the person fails to perceive an unjustifiable risk that the result 
will occur; the risk must be of such a nature and degree that the failure to perceive it 
constitutes a deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable person would observe 
in the situation. 
Id. 
159. Id. at 1268. 
160. See id. at 1278-79. The court of appeals reversed on other grounds and did not 
address the issue of the appropriate standard of culpability. See Hazelwood v. State, 836 
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because it was essential to furthering an important public policy: deterrence 
of W r e  oil spills.lbl 
The Hazelwood court stated that criminal convictions might be 
predicated on findings of ordinary negligence when the offense involves a 
heavily regulated activity that can cause widespread serious harm.'62 Here, 
although the court did not expressly state that oil transportation is heavily 
regulated,'63 it maintained that the ordinary negligence standard was 
necessary to protect society from potential harm.'64 The court noted that 
P.2d 943 (Alaska Ct. App. 1992). The supreme court reversed part of that decision and 
remanded the case to the court of appeals. See State v. Hazelwood, 866 P.2d 827 (Alaska 
1993). On remand, the court of appeals again reversed Hazelwood's conviction - this time 
on the ground that Hazelwood should have been tried under a criminal negligence theory 
rather than the civil negligence standard of culpability. See Hazelwood, 912 P.2d at 1279. 
The court concluded that the unadorned use of the word "negligently" created an ambiguity 
as to whether the statute rested on criminal or ordinary negligence. See id. at 1278 n. 15. 
It surveyed its past decisions and held that the imposition of criminal liability based on 
simple negligence is appropriate "only for offenses dealing with heavily regulated activities 
for which permits or licenses are required." Id. at 1279 (quoting Cole v. State, 828 P.2d 175, 
178 (Alaska Ct. App. 1992)). The State subsequently petitioned for review, and the supreme 
court reversed. Hazelwood, 946 P.2d at 886. 
161. Hmelwood, 946 P.2d at 883 (noting that "the threat of punishment for objective 
fault will deter people from conducting themselves in such a way as to create risk to others"). 
The court stated that 
it cannot be disputed that the threat of punishment necessarily deters. Even when an 
offender does not of his own accord realize that his conduct is wronghl, he can in many 
cases be made to take care. Coercion that causes the offender to pay attention can serve 
important social aims that would not be achieved by proscriptions that only come into 
effect when the transgressor recognizes the harm in his or her behavior. 
Id. "Reasonable deterrence . . . is the basic principle of the due process balance between 
individual and societal interests." Id. at 884. "[Tlhe negligence standard is constitutionally 
permissible because it approximates what the due process guarantee aims at: an assurance 
that criminal penalties will be imposed only when the conduct at issue is something society 
can reasonably expect to deter." Id. 
162. See id. at 877. 
163. The court of appeals indicated that the incident involved a heavily regulated 
activity. See Hazelwood, 912 P.2d at 1279. Specifically, the court noted that "[allthough 
Hazelwood's conduct actually involved his participation in a commercial, heavily regulated 
activity for which he was required to be licensed, the statute under which [he] was convicted 
does not restrict itself to this type of commercial activity." Id. However, the supreme court 
did not address this issue and did not label oil transportation as a heavily regulated industry. 
See generally Hmelwood, 946 P.2d at 875-90. 
164. See id. at 884-85. 'The legislature made 'negligence' the standard of liability. 
Unadorned, this word is commonly understood to mean ordinary negligence, not criminal or 
gross negligence." Id. at 885. The term "negligence," the court noted, "always denotes 
ordinary, civil negligence." Id. 
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convictions based on strict liability should be permitted when the legisla- 
ture's expectation of individual conformity is rea~onable.'~' 
Today, courts and legislatures are still somewhat uncomfortable with the 
concept of criminal punishment absent proof of gross negligence. Society's 
paramount interest in ensuring public protection, however, has permitted 
courts and legislatures to carve out exceptions to this principle.'" Convic- 
tions based on proof of ordinary negligence are justified when potential 
harm is likely to occur and is likely to be grave, either because it is likely 
to cause death, serious bodily injury, or widespread public injury.'67 Courts 
and legislatures conclude that situations in which a defendant engages in an 
inherently dangerous activity or uses an inherently dangerous instrument 
justify convictions based on ordinary negligence.I6"e rationale for 
punishment in these instances is predicated on the utilitarian theory of 
deterrence.'" Punishing individuals will put others on notice that society 
will not tolerate similar conduct.'70 
IV. PUNISHING NEGLIGENT CONDUCT 
Commentators argue that it is inappropriate to punish actors absent proof 
of some mental awareness since the actor has not contemplated the 
forbidden act.I7' They assert that punishing ordinary negligent conduct 
results in over-~riminalization"~ and that lowering the criminal law threshold 
to that of civil negligence may defeat the purpose of reserving the criminal 
law "for the most damaging wrongs and the most culpable  defendant^."'^^ 
165. See id. at 884. 'This notion of a duty of reasonable social conformity undergirds 
the entire law of mens rea." Id. 
Within the confines of this understanding, we will defer to the legislature's directives. 
It appropriately decides what conduct is inherently wrongful to reasoning members of 
society and when the social interest requires enforcement without mens rea. However, 
for deference to be accorded, it must be reasonably apparent that the enactment was in 
exercise of such judgment. Strict liability cannot be applied simply to expedite 
punishment when there is no reasonable expectation of deterrence. 
Id. 
166. See discussion supra Part I. 
167. See discussion supra Parts III.A, 1II.E. 
168. See discussion supra Parts III.C, I1I.D. 
169. See discussion supm Part 1II.A. 
170. See id. 
171. See Hall, supm note 6; see also PACKER, supm note 7; Coffee, supm note 86. 
172. John C. Coffee, Jr., Does "Unlawful" Mean "Criminal'? Reflections of the 
Discrppeating Tort/Crime Distinction in American Law, 71 B.U. L. REV. 193, 197 (1991). 
"[Lleading criminal scholars . . . have periodically warned of the danger of 
'overcriminalization': namely, excessive reliance on the criminal sanction, particularly with 
respect to behavior that is not inherently morally culpable." Id. 
173. Kenneth Mann, F'unitive Civil Sanctions: The Middlegmund Between Criminal 
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However, criminal law's goal to protect society necessitates that the 
legislature provide punishment for ordinary negligence in certain circum- 
s t a n c e ~ . ' ~ ~  Thus, when legislatures find that criminalizing particular conduct 
will deter societal harm, it is possible to assign punishment to an individual 
without risking unnecessary criminalization or losing the stigma attached to 
criminal punishment. 17' 
A.  The Appropriate Boundaries for Punishing Negligent Conduct 
1. An Answer to the Critics: It is Appropriate to Punish Ordinary 
Negligent Behavior 
Justice Holmes advocated punishment for ordinary negligence as a way 
to ensure that laws protect society to the fullest possible However, 
jurisdictions are reluctant to provide criminal sanctions against individuals 
for mere carelessness. There is a prevailing view that punishing ordinary 
negligent behavior generally should be avoided for fear of placing unreason- 
able reliance on the criminal law to cure all potential societal ills.'" TO 
avoid such consequences, courts charged with interpreting the legislative 
intent of the word "negligence" often recognize that criminal negligence 
and Civil Law, 101 YALE L.J. 1795, 1863 (1992). 
174. See infm Part 1V.A. I .  
175. See infm Part 1V.A.2. 
176. See HOLMES, supm note 4, at 55-56. 
[I]f a workman on a house-top at mid-day knows that the space below him is a street 
in a great city, he knows facts from which a man of common understanding would infer 
that there were people passing below. He is therefore bound to draw that inference, or, 
in other words, is chargeable with knowledge of that fact also, whether he draws the 
inference or not. If, then, he throws down a heavy beam into the street, he does an act 
that a person of ordinary prudence would foresee is likely to cause death, or grievous 
bodily harm, and he is dealt with as if he foresaw it, whether he does so in fact or not. 
Id. Herbert Packer, to some extent, agreed with Justice Holmes. He recognized that the 
chief purpose of the criminal law is to prevent or deter others from committing societal 
wrongs. See PACKER, supm note 7, at 9 (explaining that "there is the view that the only 
proper goal of the criminal process is the prevention of antisocial behavior"). Packer, 
however, was unwilling to adopt Justice Holmes's suggestion that the criminal law be based 
on a standard of due care. According to Packer, criminal culpability must be based on a 
higher standard, namely moral blameworthiness. See id. at 62-70. 
177. See, e.g., State v. Hazelwood, 946 P.2d 875, 878-79 (Alaska 1997); Thomas v. 
State, 85 S.E.2d 644, 645-46 (Ga. Ct. App. 1955); Shockley v. State, 82 S.E.2d 735, 736-37 
(Ga Ct. App. 1954); State v. Jones, 126 A.2d 273, 275-76 (Me. 1956); State v. Yarborough, 
905 P.2d 209, 213 (N.M. Ct. App. 1995); People v. Cruciani, 334 N.Y.S.2d 515, 521-22 
(Suffolk County Ct. 1972); State v. Wilson, 216 P.2d 630, 634 (Utah 1950); Horn v. State, 
554 P.2d 1141, 1144 (Wyo. 1976). 
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requires the prosecution to prove something more than ordinary negli- 
gence. 17* 
However, while the judicial presumption is generally against construing 
"negligence" in a criminal code as ordinary negligence, there may be 
instances when punishing such conduct achieves the goals of deterrence. 
Professor Hall, acknowledging that negligent behavior involves some 
element of conscious choice, advocates punishment if at "the time immedi- 
ately related to the dangerous behavior in. issue, . . . the defendant [has] 
knowledge, belief, or suspicion that he is endangering anything socially 
valued."'79 Other scholars, however, maintain that deterrence may be 
effective, even for negligence crimes.180 According to Herbert Packer, 
deterrence "create[s] and reinforce[s] the conscious morality and the 
unconscious habitual controls of the law-abiding."'" 
Professor John Coffee, perhaps. the most prominent opponent of 
criminalizing ordinary negligence, argues that "this blurring of the border 
between tort and crime predictably will result in injustice."18* Professor 
Coffee makes the following three important assertions: (1) punishing 
ordinary negligent conduct will unfairly penalize a wrongdoer whose 
conduct should merely be sanctioned in a manner that makes the wronged 
party whole;ls3 (2) punishing ordinary negligent conduct will "weaken the 
178. See, e.g., State v. Wilcoxon, 639 So. 2d 385, 388 (La Ct. App. 1994); State v. 
Rock, 571 So. 2d 908, 909 (La. Ct. App. 1990); Yarbomugh, 905 P.2d at 216; Santillanes 
v. State, 849 P.2d 358, 366 (N.M. 1993); State v. McLaughlin, 621 A.2d 170, 174-76 (R.I. 
1993); State v. Seibel, 471 N.W.2d 226, 234 n. 1 1 (Wis. 1991). 
179. Hall, supra note 6, at 634. Professor Hall maintains that when one acts 
negligently, he or she does not have "knowledge, belief, or suspicion that he is endangering 
anything socially valued." Id. He notes Justice Holmes's analogy that "even a dog 
understands the difference between being kicked and being stumbled over." Id. 
180. See, e.g., H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY: ESSAYS IN THE 
PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 134 (1968). Hart rebuts Professor Hall's assumption by stating that 
legal regulations can only operate through an offender's conscious reasoning: 
The connexion between the threat of punishment and subsequent good behaviour is not 
of the rationalistic kind pictured in the guiding-type of case. The threat of punishment 
is something which causes [the offender] to exert his faculties, rather than something 
which enters as a reason for conforming to the law when he is deliberating whether to 
break it or not. It is perhaps more like a goad than a guide. But there seems to me to 
be nothing disreputable in allowing the law to function in this way, and it is arguable 
that it functions in this way rather than in the rationalistic way more frequently than is 
generally allowed. 
Id. 
18 1. PACKER, supra note 7, at 65. 
182. Coffee, s rpm note 172, at 193. 
183. See id. at 193-94. Professor Coffee asserts that the "criminal law should 
generally not be used when society is unprepared to disregard the social utility of the 
defendant's behavior - that is, when it prefers to 'price' the behavior in question in order to 
force internalization of social costs. . . . [Clriminal liability for negligence is generally 
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efficacy of the criminal law as an instrument of social control;"'84 and (3) 
punishing ordinary negligence should occur in the courts where judges can 
consider the conduct at the sentencing stage.Ia5 His arguments, however, are 
substantially weakened when one considers the overriding benefit of 
punishing negligent conduct where a reasonable expectation of deterrence 
exists. 
According to Professor Coffee, punishing conduct that historically has 
been sanctioned through tort law will result in injustice to the individual.18" 
He argues that the legislature has attached financial sanctions to tort 
conduct, requiring defendants to redistribute some of their assets to the 
wronged party.18' Defendants in a tort action must balance the financial 
penalty against the value ofthe wrong. In contrast, criminal punishment 
stigmatizes the individual, placing a larger punishment and perhaps a greater 
disincentive against engaging in the particular conduct. Individuals have 
come to rely on reasonable expectations regarding the financial sanction or 
criminal punishment of a particular act and will make decisions about their 
conduct acc0rding1y.I~~ Professor Coffee maintains that if society punishes 
conduct previously sanctioned financially, it will unfairly force the 
individual to act in his own self-interest and to evaluate his own costs prior 
to engaging in any conduct.la9 
inappropriate." Id. at 194. 
184. Id. at 193. 
185. Id. at 194. "Neither legislative action nor constitutional challenge is likely to 
reverse the encroachment of the criminal law upon areas previously thought civil in 
character." Id. However, Coffee maintains that the sentencing stage provides courts with 
the ability to "draw a line between the enforcement of norms that were intended to price and 
those intended to prohibit." Id. 
186. Seeid. at 239. 
187. Id: 
188. See id. at 225. "Characteristically, tort law prices, while criminal law prohibits." 
Id. at 194. 
Normally, when we think of the criminal law, we visualize it punishing intentional 
actions willfully engaged in by the defendant. . . . The negligent defendant is frequently 
engaged in activities that have social utility and, indeed, is the same person with whom 
the law of torts regularly deals. Hence, to the extent that these forms of misbehavior 
are considered "crimes," the law should "price" the misbehavior-that is, seek to force 
the defendant to internalize the costs it imposes on others. 
Id. at 228. 
189. See id. at 225. In these identifiable instances, sanctions should be limited to 
requiring the wrongdoer to repay the victim with financial penalties. See id. In contrast, 
criminal wrongs are those that society intends to prohibit. See id. "[Plricing decisions 
cannot be made habitual." Id. Coffee argues that if individuals are punished for negligent 
acts, such individuals will be required to use Judge Hand's B<PL analysis. See id. Such 
individuals will be forced to act in his or her own self-interest and would tend to exaggerate 
his or her own costs. See id. 
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Professor Coffee incorrectly frames his argumenf in terms of the 
defendant's private interest; he is primarily concerned with the ultimate 
harm to the wrongdoer. This is a sound argument from a civil law 
perspective since tort law is designed to make the wronged party whole.lgO 
However, Professor Coffee fails to consider that the defendant's best 
interests should be secondary to society's interest in being protected by the 
criminal law.'" l i s h i n g  an individual often serves as a valuable deterrent. 
Professor Coffee asserts that if the criminal law were to adopt Learned Hand's rule for 
tort liability, 
individuals would be asked to determine if the marginal benefit to them from not taking 
additional precautions equalled or exceeded the marginal expected costs that their 
conduct. imposed on others. One suspects that individuals would tend to exaggerate 
their own costs and discount others' benefits; thus, by definition the decision would be 
self-interested. 
Id. at 225. Relying on Professor Robert Cooter, Coffee notes the difference between tort 
punishment and criminal punishment. See id. at 226. Specifically, a penalty "inherently 
creates an abrupt, discontinuous jump in the costs the actor must incur when he violates the 
legal standard." Id. In contrast, the 
abrupt jump disappears when a pricing system is used because prices are continuous and 
thus bring costs and benefits into balance. . . . Society is better advised to use prices, 
not sanctions, when it has great difficulty in specifLing the precise standard of 
precaution to be observed. This observation may help explain the historic reluctance 
of Anglo-American courts to criminalize negligence. 
Id. at 226-27. 
190. See Steven D. Smith, The Critics and the "Crisis': A Reassessment of Cumnt 
Conceptions of Tort Law, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 765, 769 (1987) (asserting that 
"[c]ompensation's cardinal principle prescribes that injured plaintiffs should receive an 
amount necessary to make them 'whole,' that is, to restore them to the position they would 
have occupied but for the defendant's tortious conduct"); see also Peter A. Bell, The Bell 
Tolls: Toward Full Tort Recovety for Psychic Injury, 36 U. FLA. L. REV. 333, 393 (1984) 
('The point of compensation in tort law is td put an injured plaintiff back in the same 
relative position that he occupied before he was injured."). 
191. See United States v. Mancuso, 420 F.2d 556, 559 (2d Cir. 1970) (maintaining that 
the primary purpose of the criminal law "is to conform conduct to the norms expressed in 
that law"); see also Kenneth G.  Dau-Schmidt, An Economic Analysis of the Criminal Law 
as a Preference-Shqing Policy, 1990 DUKE L.J. 1, 1-2 (arguing that society will criminalize 
a particular activity and attempt to shape individual preferences and behavior through 
punishment whenever the social benefits of doing so outweigh the social costs); Alon Harel, 
Efficiency and Fairness in Criminal Law: The Case for a Criminal Law Principle of 
Comparative Fault, 82 CAL. L. REV. 1 18 1, 1229 (1 994) (asserting that the criminal law 
directs its injunctions to society at large so that everyone benefits from the stability brought 
about by universal conformity with those norms); Note, Felony Murder: A  tor^ Law 
Reconceptualization, 99 HARV. L. REV. 19 1 8, 1923 (1 986) (noting that criminal punishment 
is the means by which an offender pays his debt to society). See genemlly LAFAVE & 
SCOTT, supm note 4, $ 1.5, at 22 (discussing the various theories of punishment advanced 
to serve the purpose of the criminal law: to prevent certain undesirable conduct and, thus, 
to protect various interests of society). 
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In the interest of minimizing threatened societal harms, the goals of criminal 
law at times mandate that society prohibit conduct that was previously 
punished by civil sanctions. While there is little retributive effect at the 
criminal level for defendants whose conduct involves ordinary negligence, 
punishment will communicate clearly to the community that such conduct 
is intolerable. 
Professor Coffee's second assertion, that punishing ordinary negligent 
conduct will "weaken the efficacy of the criminal law as an instrument of 
social control,"lg2 also fails to acknowledge the role of criminal law as an 
educator of society. Professor Coffee is concerned that is that "if the 
criminal law is overused, it will lose its distinctive stigma."lg3 Professor 
Coffee correctly identifies the deterrent value that is served by the 
individual's fear of stigmatization, and he expresses concern that criminally 
punishing conduct that was previously punished by tort sanctions is 
sometimes appropriate since it may serve as a "system for public communi- 
cation of values."'94 In fairness to those concerned with overcriminalization, 
punishing all conduct that was previously reserved for civil sanctions will 
dilute the power of the criminal law. 
However, as Professor Coffee asserts; "new problems may arise for 
which the criminal law is the most effective instrument, but which involve 
behavior not historically considered b l a m e w ~ r t h ~ . " ~ ~ ~  Thus, in contrast to 
his broad statement that punishing ordinary negligent conduct would 
"weaken the efficacy of the criminal law as an instrument of social 
control,"lg6 there are indeed times when the social control may be advanced, 
rather than weakened, by so doing. It is necessary to sanction conduct that 
is a threat to public safety, even if the undesirable conduct may only be 
punished through the partial elimination of mens rea. Such sanctions will 
serve to deter others from committing the same wrongs.lg7 
Professor Coffee's final assertion is that if one were to punish ordinary 
negligent conduct, this punishment would only be feasible at the sentencing 
stage.Ig8 Coffee argues that legislatures are inappropriate forums in which 
to assign punishment since they are reactive and respond hastily.lg9 
192. Coffee, supm note 172, at 193. 
193. Id. at 200-01. "Once everything wrongful is made criminal, society's ability to 
reserve special condemnation for some forms of misconduct is either lost or simply reduced 
to a matter of prosecutorial discretion." Id. at 201. 
194. Id. at 194. 
195. Id. at 200. "Modem technology, the growth of an information-based economy, 
and the rise of the regulatory state make it increasingly difficult to maintain that only the 
common law's traditional crimes merit the criminal sanction." Id. 
196. Id. at 193. 
197. See id. at 200. 
198. See id. at 240-43. 
199. See id. at 241. Professor Coffee also criticizes legislatures for their inherently 
political motivation and asserts that it is an inappropriate body to assign punishment to 
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However, it is the role of the legislature to create laws and the role of the 
judiciary to assign punishment within particular boundaries. As society's 
lawmaking body, legislatures are primarily responsible2"" for ensuring an 
orderly society.20' One way for the legislature to meet this goal is to 
identify and punish conduct that is morally reprehensible or against accepted 
social norms.202 Concededly, since legislatures are reactive, they act in 
ordinary negligent behavior. See id. Professor Coffee also argues that prosecutors should 
not be permitted to decide who should be punished for a failure to exercise due care. See 
id. ("[Flor prosecutors to decide systematically not to prosecute what the legislature has 
deemed criminal is also a politically dangerous act, one that seems to undermine the 
legislature's position as the sovereign lawmaker."). But see Bennett L. Gershman, The New 
Pmsecutors, 53 U.  PI^. L. REV. 393, 418-19 (1992) (surmising that the prosecutor has 
emerged as the central figure with the training and experience to administer crime control 
and crime prevention). 
Professor Coffee correctly asserts that courts will not draw the line between appropriate 
and inappropriate instances in which to punish for ordinary negligence because, as the 
Supreme Court has consistently held, "a crime is anything which the legislature chooses to 
say it is." Coffee, supm note 172, at 240. In contrast, he maintains that juries are not the 
appropriate forums for drawing the distinction between punishment and tort sanctions absent 
some clear framework upon which to make the decision. See id. at 239 ("[Tlhe competence 
of juries to judge issues of social utility seems highly questionable. Nonetheless, to shift 
from pricing to prohibiting without framing some role for the jury as fact-finder might be 
thought to trivialize the constitutional safeguards surrounding the trial stage."); see also 
Steven I .  Friedland, The Competency and Responsibility of Jurors in Deciding Cmes, 85 Nw. 
U .  L. REV. 190, 190-91 (1990) (describing cases in which juries had difficulty comprehend- 
ing the issues before them). See genemlly Pheobe A. Haddon, Rethinking the Juy ,  3 WM. 
& MARY BILL RTS. J. 29 (1994). 
200. Although the legislature is responsible primarily for defining crimes, there is often 
a need for judicial intervention. The rule of lenity, which requires that penal statutes be 
strictly construed in favor of the defendant, was developed in response to the "idea that 
courts should be reluctant to infer that a statute has wrought changes in rights, duties, and 
remedies beyond those that are affected by the statute's express terms." Shapiro, supm note 
42, at 935. Customarily, courts have looked to this rule when interpreting ambiguous 
criminal statutes. See, e.g., United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 347 (1971) ("[Almbiguity 
concerning the ambit of criminal statutes should be resolved in favor of lenity."). If the 
penal statute "is unambiguous, [then] the rule of lenity . . . is inapplicable." Beecham v. 
United States, 5 1 1 U.S. 368, 374 (1994). 
201. "It is the legislature . . . which is to define a crime, and ordain its punishment." 
Dowling v. United States, 473 U.S. 207, 214 (1985) (quoting United States v. Wiltberger, 
18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 76, 95 (1820)). The boundary between moral conduct and immoral 
conduct is generally defined by the legislature through the dictates of the applicable criminal 
law. As the branch most directly accountable to the people, only the legislature can validate 
the surrender of individual freedom that is necessary to the formation of the social contract. 
Therefore, the legislature is the only legitimate institution for enforcing societal judgments 
through the penal law. See genemlly Jeffries, supm note 39. 
202. Paul H. Robinson, The Criminal-Civil Distincrion and rhe Urility of Desen, 41 
B.U. L. REV. 201, 202 (1996) (noting that criminal punishment "serves a communicative 
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response to unforeseen consequences that create risk of great harm.203 For 
example, legislatures and courts have criminalized the ordinary negligent 
conduct that is exhibited while driving an a~tomobile.~"~ Until the advent 
of the automobile, one could not foresee the harm that would result from 
driving. Such laws exemplify why a reactive legislature may be appropriate. 
A reactive legislature is essential to continue to protect society from 
unpredictable harms. 
Professor Coffee's argument is also unclear because he fails to define 
"hasty" satisfactorily. Legislatures may enact legislation only after a lengthy 
consideration process.205 However, in fairness to Professor Coffee, legisla- 
tures sometimes act randomly; thus, the criminal law is sometimes applied 
broadly and thoughtlessly. Courts, however, -seem to act with similar 
randomness, deciding opinions on a case-by-case basis. When it is left to 
the judiciary to define inherently dangerous instruments or activities, there 
is a risk of -'disparity among various intermediate courts in a particular 
jurisdiction. Because of the potential for inconsistency, it is imperative that 
the legislature adopts a formula or principle to apply when criminalizing 
ordinary negligence. 
2. A Prescription for the Legislature 
The legislature should continue to limit punishment for ordinary 
negligence only to instances when it determines that the conduct is likely to 
threaten death, serious bodily injury, or widespread public injury. In other 
function in our society, separating and labelling [sic] certain behavior as morally condem- 
nable"); see Mann, supm note 173, at 1796-801 (describing the paradigms of criminal and 
civil law as punishment and compensation, respectively). 
203. See, e.g., Jim Jensen, Bikers' Choice: Education, Freedom, ROCKY MM. NEWS 
(Denver), Jan. 30, 1998, at 16C (reporting that State Representative Bob Bacon "is 
considering adding ski helmets to his legislation calling for mandatory helmet usage" in 
response to the recent deaths of prominent celebrities); Wina Sturgeon, Deadly Slopes; 
Safety: A MA Wants Helmet Requirement, But Would It Help? Sdety: Would Helmets 
Prevent Deaths?, SALT LAKE TRIB., Jan. 7, 1998, at Al (reporting that the American Medical 
Association urges legislation requiring adults to wear ski helmets when skiing). 
204. See supm notes 103-20 and accompanying text. 
205. Prior to becoming a law, legislation must be introduced into the appropriate 
legislative body. The legislation, commonly referred to as a bill, must be considered in 
committee hearings and floor debates. Following recommendation from the appropriate 
committee, the bill is referred to the appropriate legislative body for consideration by all 
representatives of that body. If the full legislative body votes to enact the legislation, it is 
then referred to either the state's governor, or the President, who must sign the bill into law. 
See generally Robert F .  Blomquist, 'To Stir Up Public Interest'? Edmund S. Muskie and the 
U. S. Senate Special Subcommittee 's Water Pollution Investigations and Legislative A ctivities, 
1963-66 - A Case Study in E d y  Congressional Envimnmental Policy Development, 22 
COLUM. J .  ENVTL. L. 1 (1 997). 
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words, the legislature should criminalize ordinary negligence if (1) a 
significant portion of the population regularly engages in such conduct; (2) 
such conduct will cause harm to a significant portion of the population; and 
(3) a reasonable person should know that the conduct is likely to cause 
harm. This principle should guide all legislatures in formulating statutes and 
should guide all courts in interpreting them.206 
Section one of this principle suggests that the legislature should punish 
conduct in which a large portion of society participates with some regularity. 
This section is meant to ensure that there is some deterrent value in the 
proposed criminal punishment. When few people engage in a particular 
conduct, punishment will not coerce a significant number of individuals to 
conform their behavior to societal norms.207 By requiring the legislature to 
evaluate the frequency with which members of society engage in the 
conduct, section one limits punishment to instances where there is a 
reasonable expectation of deterrence. 
Section two limits punishment to instances when the conduct is likely 
to cause harm to a significant portion of the population. Historically, 
legislatures and courts have permitted punishment based on ordinary 
negligent conduct when a defendant used an inherently dangerous instru- 
ment,208 engaged in an inherently dangerous activity?O9 or was likely to 
cause widespread public Courts have justified criminal punishment 
based on ordinary negligence in these instances to guarantee a greater 
likelihood of successful prose~ution.~" Permitting punishment under these 
circumstances has historic roots in the Industrial Revolution, when 
206. Since each legislature has the power to define its own crimes, there is no 
requirement that the criminal definition of a particular conduct must be consistent throughout 
the country. The federal government may not require uniformity among state legal systems. 
See U.S. CONST. amend. X ('The powers not delegated to the United States by the 
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to 
the people."). Consequently, state diversity in legislation is encouraged. See DRESSLER, 
supm note 17, 8 4.03, at 23-24. Whatever limitations the Constitution imposes on the states 
with respect to "the administration of criminal justice" do not "concern . . . the powers of 
the States to define crime." Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 168 (1952). 
Additionally, moral values, demographics, and public interests may vary from state to 
state. Individual states can proscribe criminal conduct in the manner they deem appropriate. 
For example, State X may deem prostitution morally reprehensible and make it a felony to 
engage in such conduct. On the other hand, State Y may not view the matter as a serious 
one and may not criminalize the conduct at all. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT 
OF LAWS 5 3 (1971). Each state is autonomous; it is a temtorial unit with a distinct general 
body of law. See id. 
207. See supm text accompanying notes 34-37. 
208. See discussion supm Part II1.C. 
209. See discussion supm Part II1.D. 
210. See discussion supm Pan 1II.E. 
21 1. See supm notes 134, 135 and accompanying text. 
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lawmakers found that the only way to deter certain types of harm was to 
define crimes in a way that would ensure successful prose~ution.~'~ Section 
two allows the legislature to respond to future, unknown harms. It requires 
the legislature to evaluate the conduct it seeks to legislate and to consider 
whether it is similar to the historical exceptions. 
Section three provides that the legislature should criminalize an actor's 
failure to use due care in instances that meet the requirements of sections 
one and two. By defining the intent element for these crimes as when a 
reasonable person should know that the conduct is likely to cause harm, 
section three becomes a vehicle whereby prosecutors are better equipped to 
convict individuals for careless crimes that cause significant or widespread 
harm. 
When this principle is applied, it is easy to understand why it works. 
In United States v. Frezzo Brothers, ~nc.:'~ the court defined the term 
"negligence" in the Clean Water Act as "ordinary negligen~e."~'~ Conse- 
quently, the prosecution was able to convict the defendant of the 
Frezzo stood for the proposition that clean, safe water is of the utmost 
importance; therefore, individuals should take all reasonable precautions to 
avoid potential pollution or face punishment. Justified by the principle of 
deterrence, the defendant's punishment accomplished the goal of deterrence 
that the prosecution sought. 
Likewise, the Nebraska legislature concluded that the potential for harm 
from careless automobile driving was paramount to concerns for the 
inadvertent individual.*I6 In State v.   at tan,^" the court upheld the 
defendant's conviction for failure to maintain a proper lookout while 
driving.218 This decision was based on the legislative enactment of a rule 
that permitted punishment for negligent driving.219 Although many would 
argue that punishment under these facts is unjustified since even the best 
drivers could do this, the legislature's decision to pave the way for criminal 
punishment was appropriate because of the significant societal interests at 
stake. 
In State v. ~arnett;~' the court provided similar guidelines for the 
legislature in considering whether to punish particular conduct for failure to 
use due care. The court's findings fit squarely into the principle; therefore, 
the decision illustrates the proper boundaries by which courts and legisla- 
See supm notes 136-38 and accompanying text. 
602 F.2d 1 123 (3d Cir. 1979). 
See id. at 1 128-30. 
See id. at 1123. 
See gene& State v. Mattan, 300 N.W.2d 810 (Neb. 198 1). 
300 N.W.2d 810 (Neb. 1981). 
Id. at 81 1 .  
See id. at 813. 
63 S.E.2d 57 (S.C. 1951). 
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tures should limit punishment for careless conduct. In Bumett, the court 
considered the appropriate punishment for a driver's careless, and ultimately 
fatal, use of an aut~mobile .~~ '  The South Carolina Supreme Court 
recognized the increasing frequency with which careless automobile fatalities 
were occurring.222 With this recognition, the court met the requirements of 
section one.223 The court was concerned that past decisions to treat 
automobiles as inherently dangerous weapons and to allow convictions based 
on ordinary negligence were too harsh.224 However, after an exhaustive 
review of precedent, the majority concluded that society's need to punish the 
individual as a warning to others was paramount to preserving the historical 
presumption that punishment is reserved for morally culpable actors.225 This 
finding illustrates that the court implicitly met the requirements of section 
two of the principle.226 Because the court determined that increased automo- 
bile use was likely to cause significant harm, it permitted criminal 
punishment based on proof of ordinary negligen~e.~~' Thus, the Bamett 
decision complied with all three elements. 
The determination of what should .be deemed an inherently dangerous 
instrument is, arguably, better left to the legislature. The Bamett court's 
exhaustive analysis suggests that it would have preferred that the South 
Carolina legislature had made such a prono~ncement .~~~ Thus, the Bumett 
decision supports the contention that when a legislative or judicial body 
decides whether to permit punishment based on ordinary negligence and 
considers the above-enumerated factors, its decision is likely to be a sound, 
fair one that furthers the principles of criminal law. 
Failure to adhere to the above-mentioned principle will result in 
unnecessary punishment. For instance, the Oklahoma penal code permits 
punishment for any act that causes harm upon a showing of ordinary 
negligence.229 In Harless v. State,230 the court punished the defendant for 
relying on her boyfriend, a paramedic, for a medical decision.231 This 
reliance led to the death of her Punishing the defendant in Hurless 
22 1 .  See id. at 62. 
222. See id. 
223. Section one requires proof that many people engage in a particular conduct so 
that punishment is limited to instances where there is meaningful deterrent value. See supm 
text accompanying notes 208-09. 
224. See Bamett, 63 S.E.2d at 62. Although the court felt that the rule was too harsh, 
it recognized that the Legislature is the body that should change the law. See id. 
225. See id. 
226. See supm text accompanying notes 2 10-14. 
227. Seeid. at 61. 
228. See generally id. 
229. See Harless v. State, 759 P.2d 225 (Okla Crim. App. 1988). 
230. Id. 
23 1 .  See id. at 226-27. 
232. See id. 
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did not further the necessary goal of deterrence since the defendant's 
conduct was merely an act of bad'judgment. Individuals frequently engage 
in bad judgment; when they do, they are generally unaware of their conduct, 
its potential harm, or the punishment they might receive as a result of such 
conduct. Professor Hall argues that it is difficult to deter thoughtless crimes 
since those engaged in such crimes have not thought of "their dangerous 
behavior[] or any  sanction[^]."^^^ Bad judgment alone is unique, not 
widespread, and therefore, it is not suitable for deterrence purposes. 
Conversely, widespread acts of bad judgment resulting in substantial serious 
bodily injury or death should be criminalized. 
The legislature and the courts can safeguard against over-criminalization 
by limiting punishment to instances when a significant number of people 
engage in'identifiable conduct or when the conduct is likely to cause wide- 
spread injury. The legislature can and should define bad judgment in 
instances when enough people are engaging in the particular conduct. When 
a significant number of people are likely to engage in conduct known to be 
potentially harmful, it is appropriate to "sacrifice the individual"234 for the 
greater good of protecting society. 
B. Extending Punishment for Carelessness into the Twenty-First Century 
As we approach the new millennium, the increased potential for 
technologically related accidents makes it essential for legislatures to expand 
the legislative umbrella to include new acts and actors. This will ensure that 
society remains relatively free from potential harm. New technological and 
safety advances have yielded seemingly protective instruments and activities 
that will cause great harm when used carelessly. Legislatures and judiciaries 
must identify the potentially fatal conduct in which a significant portion of 
the population regularly engages. They must also identify conduct that is 
likely to threaten a significant portion of the population. Finally, they must 
take the logical next step and criminalize the carelessness that results from 
such conduct as a means to deter others. Applying the principle to 
seemingly benign instruments will deter others from engaging in negligent 
conduct and will limit the resulting harm. 
Use of a car phone, conduct in which a significant portion of the 
population regularly engages, is a fine example of conduct that threatens 
death or serious bodily injury. A recent study indicated that drivers who 
talk on car phones are thirty-four times more likely to have an accident than 
drivers who do not use car phones.235 A report in the New England Journal 
- - 
233. See Hall, supm note 6, at 241. 
234. HOLMES, supm note 4, at 49. 
235. Gil Griffin, Dial 'S' For Sidetmcked: Car Phones Get No Ringing Endomements 
from Sqfety Researchem, SAN DIEGO UNION & TRIB., July 29, 1997, at El. The study was 
based on interviews with 100 drivers who had accidents within the last two years, and 100 
Heinonline - -  65 Tenn. L. Rev. 920 1997-1998 
19981 CRIMINALIZING NEGLIGENCE 92 1 
of Medicine confirms that use of a car phone is more likely to cause harm 
than driving above the speed limit.236 Punishing the careless use of car 
phones would alert others that their failure to use due care could threaten 
their liberty. Thus, punishment in this instance would effectively decrease 
the amount of harm caused by the negligent use of car phones.237 
In today's society, car phones are the first step toward using the car as 
an office. Cutting-edge technology also provides computers and faxes that 
operate in the Lawmakers will thwart the purpose of criminal law as 
society's protector unless they enact statutes to prevent the harm that may 
result from distracted drivers who operate vehicles while trying to conduct 
business. 
Legislatures should also identify and criminalize the failure to use, or 
the negligent use of, available safety devices. Punishment for such behavior 
will help protect society from unnecessary harm because it will serve as a 
deterrent to others. Under current law, few remedies exist to punish those 
who negligently maintain or use safety devices. 
  or example, in Illinois, the prosecution was unable to convict an 
individual whose careless maintenance of a smoke detector led to the death 
of a three-year-old The defendant's carelessness did not rise to the 
necessary level of criminal culpability.240 A jury considering this case 
determined that the defendant's failure to properly maintain his smoke alarm 
was not sufficient evidence of recklessness to convict under Illinois law.241 
Changing the law to permit a judge to instruct the jury on ordinary 
drivers who had not had accidents in ten years. See id. Researchers noted that an individual 
who talks on the phone for more than fifty minutes per month while driving is five times 
more likely to have an accident than are drivers who do not use a car phone. See id. 
According to the researchers who conducted the study, using a telephone while driving can 
be as risky as driving while intoxicated. See id. 
236. See Malcolm Maclure & Murray A. Mittleman, Cautions About Cur Telephones 
and Collisions, 336.NEW ENG. J .  MED. 501 (1997); see also Leslie Keiling, It's The Drivers, 
Not Cur Phones, That Can Make Road Dangerous, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Feb. 16, 1997, at 35. 
237. Punishing the negligent use of car phones is preferable to a complete ban on the 
phones. Car phones, if used properly, can also serve as lifesavers. See id. For example, car 
phones are often used for emergency calls. See id. However, Representative Robert J. 
Bugielski from Chicago "has introduced legislation that would ban hands-on car phone use." 
Id. According to the medical journal, however, this will do little, if anything, to solve the 
problem since the number of accidents attributable to car phone use is more closely related 
to inattention than manual dexterity. See id. Punishing the careless use of car phones would 
permit and promote safe use of the phones without denying individuals the benefits that 
accompany car phones. 
238. Marco R. della Cava, Luxury-Cat- Makers Happily Cater to Any Whim, USA 
TODAY, Feb. 16, 1998, at 3B. 
239. See Hanna, supm note 1 .  
240. See id. 
24 1. See id. 
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negligence would achieve the desired result of ensuring a conviction, 
thereby allowing punishment of this crime and serving as a deterrent to the 
careless use of safety devices. 
Measuring the careless use of a smoke detector against the principle that 
legislatures should follow when criminalizing conduct based on ordinary 
negligence yields the proper result. After all, failure to properly maintain 
a smoke detector can cause death or serious bodily injury. Section one of 
the principle requires proof that a significant portion of the population 
regularly engages in such In the United States, most homes are 
equipped with smoke detectors. Section two requires a legislative finding 
that significant harm will result from the negligent use of the instrument.243 
Smoke alarms are installed as a safety measure. Thus, the failure to 
properly maintain and use a safety device necessarily will result in a 
condition that is less safe than one in which the safety device is properly 
installed. Applying section three, a reasonable person should know that the 
failure to maintain a working smoke detector could result in harm.244 It is 
entirely appropriate to punish the careless maintenance of smoke detectors 
since substantial harm may result therefrom, and there is a reasonable 
expectation that the punishment will deter others. 
The past few decades have yielded a host of safety devices and 
technological advances which, when carelessly used or maintained, threaten 
the safety of a significant portion of the population. In addition to smoke 
detectors, society has come to rely on window-guards, child safety seats, and 
bicycle helmets to save them from potential dangers. Legislators have 
focused on the importance of installing and using these devices, often 
making it a strict liability offense for failure to install and use them.245 
242. See supm text accompanying note 208-09. 
243. See supm text accompanying notes 2 10-14. 
244. See supm text accompanying note 208. 
245. See, e.g., People v. Nemadi, 53 1 N.Y.S.2d 693 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 1988) (discussing 
city health and administrative code provisions that require the installation of window guards 
in apartments inhabited by children under the age of eleven on a strict liability basis). Several 
states have also enacted legislation requiring use of child safety seats. For example, Alabama 
provides: 
It is unlawful (1) For any person under the age of sixteen years to operate or be a 
passenger on a bicycle unless at all times the person wears a protective bicycle helmet 
of good fit fastened securely upon the head with the straps of the helmet. (2) For any 
person to operate a bicycle with a passenger who weighs less than forty pounds or is 
less than forty inches in height unless the passenger is properly seated in and adequately 
secured in a restraining seat. 
ALA. CODE 4 32-5A-283 (1997). Connecticut has a similar statute which provides: 
Any person who transports a child under the age of four years, weighing less than forty 
pounds, in a motor vehicle on the highways of this state shall provide and require the 
child to use a child restraint system approved pursuant to regulations adopted by the 
Department of Motor.Vehicles . . . . 
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These regulations result in minimal financial penalties and do not attach 
significant punishment for improper maintenance.246 The mere presence of 
a safety device, however, will not provide protection from harm. The safety 
device must be properly maintained to work. Failure to assign meaningful 
punishment to the failure to properly use or maintain safety devices will 
result in society's inability to use sanctions for such careless conduct as a 
deterrent to guard from future harm.247 
The criminal law protects society fi-om harm by punishing conduct for 
deterrent purposes and thereby alerting others that they must change their 
course of conduct to avoid criminal sanctions.248 Although legal theorists 
and jurisprudential scholars generally support this theory of deterrence, some 
question the validity of punishing ordinary negligent conduct under any 
theory of punishment.249 On balance, however, punishing ordinary negligent 
conduct as a means to promote greater societal safety outweighs the private 
interests of the individual. Justice Holmes supported this position, asserting 
that punishment of the individual is appropriate when it will induce others 
to conform to societal rules.2s0 
Courts and legislatures have provided for punishment of ordinary 
negligent conduct when a defendant carelessly handles an inherently 
dangerous instrument, engages in an inherently dangerous activity, or causes 
widespread public harm.25' Punishment in these instances is justified since 
the need for punishment as a deterrent is paramount to the rights of the 
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. 4 14-100(d) (West Supp. 1998). 
246. See supm note 34-37 and accompanying text. 
247. Criminalizing negligent misconduct that has a widespread potential for serious 
harm will affect the basis for tort recovery. It is widely held that the violation of a criminal 
statute may constitute negligence per se, relieving the plaintiff of the burden of proving 
negligence and shifting to the defendant the burden of showing an adequate excuse for such 
misconduct. See Keith v. Beard, 464 S.E.2d 633 (Ga Ct. App. 1995); Martin v. Herzog, 126 
N.E. 814 (N.Y. 1920); Ott v. Pittrnan, 463 S.E.2d 101 (S.C. Ct. App. 1995); RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF TORTS 8 286,288A (1965). But see Young v. Butts, 685 N.E.2d 147, 15 1 (Ind. 
Ct. App. 1997) (violation of a motor vehicle statute is not negligence per se, rather it creates 
a rebuttable presumption of negligence, which can be overcome by evidence that the person 
who violated the statute acted reasonably). Expanding the criminal law to include additional 
substandard conduct, therefore, may enhance its deterrent effect since the criminalization may 
create an additional punitive sanction for the negligent individual. See Commonwealth v. 
Breighner, 684 A.2d 143, 148 (Pa. 1996) (where violation of a statute is negligence per se, 
"success in the criminal suit would be of great benefit in the civil suit."). 
248. See discussion supm Part 11; see supm notes 15- 18, 20 and accompanying text. 
249. See supm notes 24-27 and accompanying text. 
250. See supra notes 29-3 1 and accompanying text. 
25 1. See discussion supm Parts I1I.C-E. 
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individual. However, punishing careless conduct is not always appropriate 
and should only be permitted under certain circumstances since society must 
also ensure that the individual will remain free from punishment unless such 
punishment is essential to promoting public safety. Legislatures should limit 
criminal punishment to instances when there is a reasonable expectation that 
the prohibited conduct can be deterred. It is appropriate for legislatures to 
criminalize ordinary negligent conduct when (1) a significant portion of the 
population regularly engages in such conduct; (2) such conduct will cause 
harm to a significant portion of the population; and (3) a reasonable person 
would know that the conduct is likely to cause harm. 
As society advances beyond the current frontiers of the technological 
revolution, we are increasitigly prone to more distractions. While the new 
millennium offers the potential for new safety devices, technological 
advances, and activities involving equipment or substances yet to be 
discovered, careless use of these instruments or participation in particular 
activities involving these discoveries is likely to yield a significant type of 
harm against which criminal law must protect. However, when enacting 
new laws to prohibit specific negligent conduct, legislatures must be 
reasonably sure that new crimes do not result in an undue curtailment of the 
individual's rights. 
Legislatures that enact new laws pursuant to the above-defined principle 
can remain confident that such laws will -promote societal safety while 
avoiding unnecessary prosecution. Limiting criminal punishment to 
instances in which an actor failed to use due care and to situations when 
sections one and two of the above-defined principle have been met will set 
reasonable boundaries and will guard against the potential for unfair 
punishment. Indeed, following the principle will provide a logical approach 
toward criminalizing negligence. 
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